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ABSTRACT
Digital preservation is fundamental to information stewardship in the 21st century. Although
much useful work on preservation strategies has been accomplished, we do not yet have an
adequate conceptual framework that articulates precisely and formally what preservation
actually is. The intention of the account provided here is to bring us closer to this goal.
Following an initial analysis of the concept of preservation as it occurs in ordinary discourse
around digital stewardship, several influential preservation models are analyzed, identifying
both useful insights and problems. A framework of interrelated concepts is then developed
that analyzes the challenges of long term digital stewardship through the lens of informa-
tion communication. Successful digital stewardship is understood as reliable, mediated,
intentional communication with an emphasis on the agents involved in the process and the
roles they play in supporting the intended flow of information through time and inevitable
changes in the underlying mediating communication technology. The complex notion of the
digital object, commonly considered the persistent unit of digitally–communicated infor-
mation, is unpacked into its fundamental abstract and concrete components, avoiding the
common category mistakes that pervade digital preservation discourse and impede a clear
understanding of the nature of preservation. This conceptual framework makes use of the
conceptual machinery of Situation Theory [Devlin, 1995] and the Gricean theory of mean-
ing [Grice, 1957,Grice, 1968]. The notion of an interpretive frame [Dubin et al., 2011] is
adopted here to model the contingent mapping between the fundamental components in-
volved in the representation of information and extended with the notion of a constraint
ii
(from Situation Theory) to clarify the role of agent intentionality in the process of estab-
lishing the appropriate mappings that ultimately support the successful communication of
units of information. This agent–based intentional perspective not only captures the social
and contextual nature of successful digital stewardship, but also promises to support a finer
grained analysis of preservation expectations from different stakeholders and the potential
practical strategies to fulfill them. This research is intended as a contribution to the overall
digital preservation agenda by bringing us closer to sound conceptual foundations for the
long–term stewardship of our digital scientific and cultural heritage.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The notion of preserving digital information is a fundamental concept in recent digital and
data stewardship agendas [Task Force on Archiving of Digital Information et al., 1996,
Duerr et al., 2004]. Definitions of digital preservation and digital curation directly appeal to
this idea. Expressions like “preserving digital information” [Hedstrom, 1997,Waugh et al.,
2000,Chen, 2001] or “maintaining digital information” [CCSDS, 2002,Webb, 2003] are also
routinely used in the literature and scholarly discourse to refer to the ultimate goal of digital
preservation efforts.1
Despite the broad adoption of technical terms, the discourse we use to approach the
challenges of long-term stewardship —whether in the scientific literature or the hallways of
libraries and laboratories— does not reflect a conceptual framework that is sufficiently clear
and consistent to be serviceable for resolving these challenges.
The problem has multiple roots, but at its heart is that the notion of preservation itself,
derived from the traditional library, archive, and museum practice of “minimizing deterio-
ration or damage” of physical artefacts, appears to be a metaphor that misrepresents what
is really going on in digital stewardship scenarios, where there is no identifiable thing that
is being literally preserved.
Describing stewardship expectations, strategies, and goals in terms of preserving some-
thing cannot deliver a precise account of what it means for something ‘digital’ to be main-
tained over time, nor properly represent how specific expectations of different communities
1See also [Yakel, 2007].
1
are fulfilled in the practice. Although some approaches to conceptualizing preservation do
attempt to transcend literal preservation, none of them have been able to fully articulate an
alternative account that is sufficiently clear and precise.
Part of the problem is that most theories of preservation make critical use of terms such as
‘digital object’, ‘digital material’, and ‘digital information’ to describe the objects intended
to be preserved, but provide these terms with only a loosely defined semantics. In addition,
technical terms like ‘file’ or ‘bitstream’, which are borrowed from computer science, are not
necessarily used in a well–defined technical sense.
In what follows we will begin by demonstrating that literal interpretations of expressions
such as ‘preserving a digital object’ or ‘preserving digital information’ are not plausible and
so they will be deeply inadequate for guiding the development of a formal theory of digital
preservation.
Works within the digital preservation community do provide insights that help us move
beyond literal interpretation and to understand these expressions more usefully and chari-
tably. However, they do not individually deliver precise and complete accounts and most
show critical flaws.
Building on the insights of this prior work, as well as models developed by the Data
Conservancy Data Concept (DCDC) research group at Illinois, this dissertation appeals to
the Gricean theory of meaning [Grice, 1957,Grice, 1968,Grice, 1969] and to the ontology
and formal machinery of Situation Theory [Devlin, 1995,Devlin, 2006] to develop consistent
conceptual foundations for digital preservation based on a robust plausible ontology and
that promise to be useful for meeting the challenges of digital stewardship.
The basic approach reflects the notion that preservation efforts must “validate the com-
munication from the past” and “enable communication with the future” [Moore, 2008],
although it also considers digital preservation itself a form of communication [Mois et al.,
2009]. Conditions for successful digital ‘preservation’ are understood in terms of conditions
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to enable a sustained and reliable information communication through time and potential
changes in technology.
This project focuses on the preservation of propositional information,2 starting with the
meaning assigned to a digital artefact in the intentional act of its ‘creation’, and accounting
for the influence of stewardship expectations, intents, and strategies. In explaining what
successfully ‘preserving information’ really is, we provide a framework for understanding
when and why potential communication failure might happen and how to avoid those failures.
Although limiting our treatment to propositional information, we of course recognize that
there are other features of digital materials that are significant and that must also be ac-
counted for in successful preservation; for example, materials with visual characteristics that
cannot be reduced to propositional information (e.g. digital pictures, moving images, digital
art, etc.) or material with interactive components (e.g. video games and other interactive
media). However we think that a unified conceptual framework that precisely describes how
propositional information is represented and communicated in preservation scenarios is a
substantial step towards a complete theory of preservation.
The application of such a framework to the digital domain reveals how expectations and
goals in digital stewardship can be analyzed —and the means for achieving them— by (a)
enabling the use of precise terminology and concepts and (b) revealing why, if information is
considered the ultimate target of preservation efforts, we reach different decisions in different
contexts.
This framework is also intended to be utilized as a high–level analytical tool in support of
preservation activities —e.g. choice of preservation actions, proper metadata characterization—
and systems analysis and design in digital preservation.
Ultimately, the goal of this research is to move forward the agenda of developing sound
2We take a traditional approach that considers propositions to be abstract things which can be the objects
of propositional attitudes (such as belief or doubt), the bearers of truth values, and the language–independent
entities that are the meanings of those sentences (or other symbol structures) expressing them. For a more
extensive treatment, see the entry ‘Proposition’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [McGrath, 2012].
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conceptual foundations for digital stewardship.
1.1 Research problems
The following research problems are addressed in this research.
RQ1: What do we mean by ‘preserving digital information’?
Clearly, we already have some notion of what it is to preserve digital information. However,
it is difficult to articulate that notion in a clear and precise manner. A successful answer
to RQ1 will be a conceptual analysis [Furner, 2004b] of preserving information. This will
include both the achieved formal definition and a discussion demonstrating that the definition
is correct.
RQ2: What are the problems with current digital preservation models?
There are several conceptual models of digital preservation that are sophisticated, influential,
and insightful. What do they get right? What are their flaws?
RQ3: Is there an ontologically sound conceptual framework for digital
preservation that incorporates the insights of existing models but avoids their
problems?
This research question can be answered by presenting such a framework and then arguing
that it is both successful at clearly modeling preservation scenarios and avoiding the problems
other models have.
1.2 Organization of chapters
The dissertation is organized according to the following chapters.
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Chapter 2
In Chapter 2 we present the methods adopted for this research and relevant conceptual and
analytical frameworks this research builds upon.
Chapter 3
In Chapter 3 we show how definitions of preservation have evolved to address the evolving
nature of information–carrying objects, culminating in definitions of digital preservation
where the emphasis is on maintaining access and not preserving objects.
Chapter 4
In Chapter 4 we take a closer look at the broadly adopted notions of preserving the bits
and preserving information, noting how preservation in its literal sense does not apply to
the preservation scenarios being described, nor it is required for successful preservation. We
then suggest alternative accounts.
Chapter 5
In Chapter 5 we explore three influential approaches to digital preservation that more accu-
rately describe the complex nature of digital material. Despite their many valuable insights,
none of these approaches deliver complete and ontologically precise accounts. We also noted
that the notion of preserving access to digital materials can be more precisely understood
from a communication perspective: preserving access to digital materials is about sustaining
interpretation and communication processes.
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Chapter 6
In Chapter 6 we elaborate on the previous topics by developing a set of interrelated concepts
useful to understand how information is represented and communicated. The emerging
conceptual framework builds on previous work by the Data Conservancy Data Concepts
group at Illinois [Dubin et al., 2009,Dubin et al., 2011,Wickett et al., 2012, Sacchi et al.,
2011a,Sacchi et al., 2011a,Sacchi et al., 2011b,Sacchi and McDonough, 2012] and is informed
by Paul Grice’s theory of meaning [Grice, 1957,Grice, 1968] and Keith Devlin’s Situation
Theory ontology [Devlin, 1995,Devlin, 2006].
Chapter 7
In Chapter 7 we apply the conceptual framework previously developed as a lens to better
understand prototypical issues and opportunities in digital stewardship. Particular emphasis
is given to the communication of information sustained by information–carrying artefacts
and the mediation roles of the agents involved. We conclude noting that successful digital
preservation shall be effectively understood as successfully sustained reliable communication
through time and across changes in the mediating digital technology.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD AND GROUNDING FRAMEWORKS
2.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methods we use in our analysis as well as the general conceptual
and analytical framework that is applied.
2.2 Method
We take a broadly formal and analytical approach towards understanding the problem of dig-
ital preservation, drawing on the principles of ontology–driven conceptual modeling [Guarino,
1995,Guarino, 2002,Guarino andWelty, 2002] and the method of conceptual analysis [Furner,
2004a] to first clarify core concepts.
Nicola Guarino [Guarino, 1995,Guarino, 2002] uses the phrase “ontology–driven concep-
tual modeling” to describe the approach adopted here towards developing precise conceptual
foundations for digital stewardship. This approach, also called “ontological modeling” [Guiz-
zardi et al., 2003], is characterized by the use of formal languages to specify the conceptu-
alization of a domain and falls within the mainstream of contemporary formal ontology as
practiced in analytic philosophy [Hofweber, 2013], artificial intelligence [Gruber et al., 1993],
and informatics for the natural sciences [Madin et al., 2007,Compton et al., 2012].
The conceptual perspective adopted here will be largely, but not entirely, ‘descriptive’
(rather than ‘revisionary’) [Strawson, 1963] with respect to its fundamental orientation,
reflecting the “cognitive bias” that is a typical of conceptual work in information science:
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“We do not commit to a strictly referentialist metaphysics related to the intrinsic
nature of the world: rather, the categories we introduce here are thought of as
cognitive artifacts ultimately depending on human perception, cultural imprints
and social conventions (a sort of ‘cognitive’ metaphysics). We draw inspiration
here from Searle’s notion of ’deep background’ [18], which represents the set of
skills, tendencies and habits shared by humans be- cause of their peculiar biolog-
ical make up, and their evolved ability to interact with their ecological niches [9].
The consequences of this approach are that our categories are at the so-called
mesoscopic level, and they do not claim any special robustness against the state
of the art in scientific knowledge: they are just descriptive notions [21] that assist
in making already formed conceptualizations explicit. They do not provide there-
fore a prescriptive (or “revisionary” [21, 15]) framework to conceptualize entities.
In other words, our categories describe entities in a post-hoc way, reflecting more
ore less the surface structure of language and cognition.” (Citations from the
original text [Gangemi et al., 2002])
In this particular context, we begin by formalizing insights and shared “conceptual schemes”
[Gangemi et al., 2002] as they emerge from current models and conceptual approches in digi-
tal preservation, and then, where problems arise, attempt to determine the minimal revisions
that will solve the described problems.
Although counterintuitive results will be avoided if possible, substantial or even radical
proposals will be made if they seem to be necessary to resolve contradictions, avoid unnec-
essary complications, and improve parsimony.
Analytical methodologies have been developed to support this modeling approach like the
influential OntoClean [Guarino and Welty, 2002], which applies notions used for ontological
analysis in philosophy. Two sets of principles from OntoClean will be applied throughout
our analysis: the principles of Essence and Rigidity and the principles of Identity and Unity.
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2.2.1 Essence and rigidity
Guarino encourages ontology developers to distinguish between types and roles [Guarino
and Welty, 2000] and provides a metaproperty, rigidity, that functions as a partial criterion
for identifying this distinction.
A property is rigid if and only if everything that has that property has it necessarily.
Every instance of a class necessarily holds it. This notion provides the ground to draw
the powerful distinction between types and roles [Guarino and Welty, 2000]. A traditional
example of this distinction is that between person and student. The class person is a type
because the property of being a person is rigid —a person is a person necessarily : if an
individual is a person, it has always been a person and cannot cease to be a person. On
the other hand, student is role a person enters into, because being a student is not a rigid
property: an individual most likely has not always been a student and eventually will cease
to be a student.
The notion of rigidity and the distinction between types and roles have proved to provide
deep insights into how to shape and make more robust conceptual models and ontologies
[Guarino and Welty, 2000].
These criteria can be used to show that the entities identified in a conceptual model
are not really independent types, but rather actual roles that other entities enter into in
particular contingent social contexts. [Renear and Dubin, 2007]. The role/type distinction
is fundamental to the analysis presented in this dissertation, allowing us to not only to
distinguish ontological kinds from role, but surfacing and emphasizing the essential role
played by human action and intention in the conceptualization of successful preservation.
2.2.2 Identity and unity
“In general, identity refers to the problem of being able to recognize individual entities in
the world as being the same (or different), and unity refers to being able to recognize all the
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parts that form an individual entity” [Guarino and Welty, 2002].
Identity conditions are criteria used to determine “circumstances in which something that
is apparently seen as one entity is actually two (or more)” in order to avoid conflation
of entities leading to category mistakes in assigning properties to things. An example of
analysis indirectly applying this principle is the distinction between the Group 1 entities
—Work, Expression, Manifestation, and Item— in the FRBR model [IFLA Study Group on
the Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records, 1998].
Unity conditions are criteria used to determine the mereology of a thing and assess whether
part/whole relationships are properly characterized. Understanding compositionality is par-
ticularly important to correctly model complex digital resources and the relationships be-
tween those components and the information a digital resource is intended to carry. We will
show how composition relationships are sometimes abused and improperly applied in the
characterization of digital resources.
Within the context of our analysis, the notions of identity and unity play a dual role:
1. They inform the analysis of current preservation models.
2. They serve as general principles to define the necessary and sufficient conditions for suc-
cessful digital preservation. Notions like integrity, authenticity and persistence through
time —commonly considered critical components of robust preservation efforts— all
bear some kind of relationship with the general notions of identity and unity, or to
“weaker”, but still related, relationships like equivalence.
2.3 Grounding conceptual and analytical frameworks
This research is informed and builds upon much previous conceptual work in information
science and communication theory.
In particular, it adapts Paul Grice’s theory of meaning [Grice, 1957] and Keith Devlin’s
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work in Situation Theory [Devlin, 1995,Devlin, 2006] and expands the work we did as Data
Conservancy Data Concept research group (DCDC).
It also builds on the many insights of previous conceptual approaches to digital preserva-
tion developed within the library and archival communities (see Chapter 4 & 5).
2.3.1 The Basic Representation Model (BRM)
The Basic Representation Model (BRM) [Wickett et al., 2012] was based on early work by
David Dubin [Sandore and Unsworth, 2010] and further developed as part of the activities of
the Data Conservancy Data Concept group (DCDC), a research group led by Allen Renear
and David Dubin and based at the Center for Informatics Research in Science and Scholarship
at the Graduate School of Library and Information Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.1
BRM was developed to better understand and model levels of representation in scientific
data. However, BRM is general enough to be effectively applied to any situation where we
need to analyze how information is represented.
In [Wickett et al., 2012] we defined the three entity types —Propositional content, Symbol
Structure, Patterned Matter & Energy— and three relationship types —Is Expressed By, Is
Encoded By, Is Inscribed In that together compose BRM.
Propositional content “In our model propositions appear as the language–independent
content expressed by symbol structures. In this sense intended propositions may be
defined as all and only those things that are either possibly true or possibly false. That
is, they are the proper subjects of truth values. The symbol structure that expresses
a proposition may also be considered true or false, but only in a derivative sense:
1The Data Conservancy Data Concept (DCDC) group was funded by the National Science Foundation as
part of the Data Conservancy, a multi–institutional NSF funded project (OCI/ITRDataNet 0830976) hosted
at Johns Hopkins University Sheridan Libraries. Carole Palmer, former CIRSS Director, was the co-PI on
the project.
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Propositional Content
Symbol Structure
Patterned Matter and 
Energy
Is Expressed By
Is Encoded By
Is Inscribed In
Figure 2.1: Basic Representation Model diagram
derivatively “true” if the proposition it expresses is true, and derivatively “false” if the
proposition it expresses is false. A common alternative account of propositions defines
them as the proper objects of epistemic attitudes, such as belief or doubt. For our
purposes these two accounts of proposition may be considered coextensive: the class
of things that can be true or false is identical with the class of things that can be
the object of epistemic attitudes. Although the significant role of propositions in our
model is as the expressed content of symbol structures, the definitions just given allow
propositions to exist independently of symbol structures.” [Wickett et al., 2012]
Symbol Structure “In our model symbol structures are abstract arrangements of symbols
that, in a given context, express propositions. Individual symbols themselves are the
atomic components of symbol structures. Although the symbol structures in our ex-
amples are in some language with a determinate semantics, our model allows symbols
and symbol structures to express different propositions in different languages or differ-
12
ent contexts. Examples of abstract objects that can serve as symbol structures include
graphs, relations, and sequences, along with more familiar kinds of symbol structures
like strings of characters.” [Wickett et al., 2012]
Patterned Matter and Energy “Whereas both propositions and symbol structures are
abstract objects, patterned matter and energy is a concrete quantity of matter and
energy that manifests a physical arrangement that is the physical inscription of an
(abstract) symbol structure. In order for a digital object to effectively communicate
information, there must be some instantiation of the symbol structures in a physical
medium that an agent can interact with.” [Wickett et al., 2012]
The relationship types in BRM are defined as follows:
Is Expressed By “Every meaningful digital object will use symbol structures to express
propositions. For instance, a digital object may use RDF triples to express proposi-
tions about species occurrence. We use the is Expressed By relationship type for this
technical sense of ‘express’. The Is Expressed By relationship type represents the fact
that the propositional content of a digital object is understood as being expressed by
a symbol structure that is the primary expression —the Primary Symbol Structure—
for that content in a particular context. Is Expressed By represents a general relation-
ship that is instantiated between specific propositional content and a specific symbol
structure.” [Wickett et al., 2012]
Is Encoded By “A digital object will typically map the symbol structures that express
propositions into other symbol structures. We call this mapping from symbol struc-
ture to symbol structure an encoding of one symbol structure by (or into) another.
For instance, a digital object may map RDF triples into the XML/RDF serialization
language. Or those same triples might be encoded in the N3 serialization language. In
each case we have the same Primary Symbol Structure —the RDF triples that express
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propositional content— but a different encoding of that primary symbol structure.
Symbol structures that are encodings of other symbol structures may in turn be en-
coded by still other symbol structures. For instance the N3 symbol structure may itself
be encoded in a UTF-8 byte sequence. Unpacking the encoding levels provides a more
complete and consistent way to represent what changes when digital objects undergo
transformations, like format migrations.” [Wickett et al., 2012]
Is Inscribed In “The Is Inscribed In relationship type represents the fact that a particular
symbol structure is represented in a physical medium through a mapping between
the symbol structure and a particular concrete arrangement of matter and energy.”
[Wickett et al., 2012]
The important aspect of BRM is its attempt to identify primitive kinds: entities that
do comply with the distinction between types and roles that is essential for proper and
consistent conceptual modeling.
Notions like Propositional Content, Symbol Structure, and Patterned Matter & Energy
reflect established ontological kinds extensively investigated in philosophical ontology and
are adopted as primitives in our discourse about digital preservation. We note that the first
two are abstract and the third is concrete; this distinction is discussed further below.
BRM provides the foundational backbone for the representation stack of information
adopted here.
2.3.2 Gricean theory of meaning
Paul Grice’s theory of meaning was first presented in a 1957 Philosophical Review article
[Grice, 1957], and later revised [Grice, 1968,Grice, 1969].
In particular, his analysis of speaker meaning runs as follows:
(G1) a utters x intending an agent b to form the belief that p
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(G2) a intends that b recognizes (1)
(G3) a intends that b forms the belief that p at least partly because b recognizes (1)
In this context we will appeal to Grice’s analysis of speaker meaning to develop an ana-
lytical account of what it means to intentionally inform.
2.3.3 Situation Theory
Originally developed by Jon Barwise and John Perry in the 80s, Situation Theory has evolved
through the contribution of many scholars, most research being conducted at the Center
for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), an interdisciplinary research center at
Stanford University.
In particular, we appeal here to Keith Devlin ‘flavor’ of Situation Theory as presented in
his influential book “Logic and Information” [Devlin, 1995] and in later papers (e.g. [Devlin,
2006]).
According to Devlin, Situation Theory is
“a set of mathematically-based tools to analyze, in particular, the way context
facilitates and influences the rise and flow of information.” [Devlin, 2006]
Situation Theory reflects some peculiar ontological commitments with respect to the na-
ture of information and how information arises from and flows in the world. Core to this
ontological perspective is the notion of a situation and infon.
The notion of situation was first introduced by Barwise and Perry in [Barwise and Perry,
1980]:
“The world consists not just of objects, or of objects, properties and relations,
but of objects having properties and standing in relations to one another. And
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there are parts of the world, clearly recognized (although not precisely individ-
uated) in common sense and human language. These parts of the world are
called situations. Events and episodes are situations in time, scenes are visually
perceived situations, changes are sequences of situations, and facts are situations
enriched (or polluted) by language.” [Barwise and Perry, 1980]
The notion of a situation has been defined in the Situation Theory literature in various,
still related, ways where the word ‘situation’ may be understood in its normal, everyday
sense, to refer to some part of the activity of the world.
Devlin describes situations as “part[s] of the activity of the world” (1991a, 11) or “highly
structured [. . . ] parts of the world that [an] agent’s behavior discriminates”. Gawron and
Peters (1990a, 16) introduce situations as “limited parts of the world containing individuals
and other objects, having properties and standing in relations”. Ginzburg and Sag (2001, 83)
conceive situations as “partial, temporally located, actual entities, whose role is to explicate
such objects as states or events”.2
Exactly what does and does not constitute a situation, according to Devlin, is largely a
matter of the capabilities of a cognitive agent in her engagement with the world.
Situation Theory is mostly concerned with human agents but can be applied effectively
to other types of agents, for example computing machines.3
Situation are behaviourally discriminated or cognitively individuated by an agent according
to a scheme of individuation.
A scheme of identification is the way an agent “carves up reality” into cognitive “man-
ageable pieces” [Devlin, 1995]. An agent recognises objects and other kinds of ‘uniformities’
in the world according to a view. It is the geometry, or syntactic rules, that allows an agent
to distinguish objects as objects bearing some unity and identity criteria.
2These definitions, among others, have been collected by Jacob Ian Lee and presented in his MS thesis
‘Situation Theory: a survey’. See http://jacoblee.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ThesisJacobLee.pdf
3In [Devlin, 1995], Devlin illustrates an example of application for a simple robot.
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One of the assumptions in Situation Theory is that “the world does not operate randomly
from one moment to the next [. . . ] but rather exhibits a great deal of regularity” [De-
vlin, 1995]. These regularities or uniformities are “cognitively individuated, or simply be-
haviourally discriminated” [Devlin, 1995] by cognitive agents according to their scheme of
individuation. Generally speaking, a scheme of individuation represents the ontology an
agent applies to make sense of its sensory perception of the world.
As they “make their way through the world” [Devlin, 1995], cognitive agents are exposed
and acquire all sort of information from the environment.
Information is understood here in the ordinary use of the term ‘information’ with emphasis
on its semantic features. According to Situation Theory, information is always ‘extracted’
by attending to discrete parts of the world —what Situation Theory calls situations.
Devlin appeals to Dretske’s distinction between analog and digital representation of infor-
mation [Dretske, 1983] —i.e. the capability to go “from the infinite continuous” that comes
with the agent “fractal–like” and fuzzy perception of the world, to the “finite and discrete”
that allows agents to “carve up reality into cognitive manageable pieces” [Devlin, 1995].
To avoid confusion with the use of the term ‘digital’ in digital preservation, a different
terminology is adopted here, one that appeals to the levels of abstraction of information
representation as identified by BRM. On this account, we align analogue representation and
digital representation, respectively, with the notion of concrete representation and symbolic
representation.
Therefore, a cognitive agent is an agent capable to abstract from the concrete to the
abstract level.
The process itself involves two stages: perception and cognition. The first stage is percep-
tion, where
“the environment becomes directly accessible to the agent by way of some form
of sensor (seeing, feeling, smelling, hearing, etc. [. . . ])” [Dretske, 1983].
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The second stage is cognition. According to Dretske, cognition
“is the conceptual mobilization of incoming information, and this conceptual
treatment is fundamentally a matter of ignoring differences (as irrelevant to an
underlying sameness) [. . . ]” [Dretske, 1983].
The process of abstraction appeals to this capability of ignoring irrelevant differences,
allowing, for example, the classification of entities in the world according to types : for
instance, the type animal (an abstract object) is assigned to all living beings that exemplify
certain characteristics (those encoded by the type animal).
Central to the discourse presented here, the process of abstraction allows us to recognise
abstract objects as individuals separate from the concrete entities realizing them. For in-
stance, the recognition of the same sentence (an abstract object of symbol structure kind)
being realized by different utterances (concrete representations in the form of patterned
sounds).
The relationship between abstract and concrete allows cognitive agents to make inferences
between types of situations, such that a situation of one type carries information about a
situation of the other. This kind of inference is governed by what situation theory calls
constraints. A constraint is, in some sense, the background knowledge the agent can apply
in the cognitive process.
Examples of constraints are “natural laws, conventions, analytic rules, linguistic rules,
empirical lawlike correspondences, or whatever” [Devlin, 1995]. The constraints an agent
is ‘attuned to or at least aware of’ [Devlin, 1995,Devlin, 2006] affect the capability of the
agent to establish such relationships, ultimately establishing what information the agent is
presented with in a given situation.
The scheme of individuation and constraints an agent brings to bear in a cognitive process
form the interpretive frame [Dubin et al., 2011] the agent applies to her perception of the
world in order to be presented with some information.
18
For a cognitive agent, information is said to be “carried by” or to “arise from”a situation
— that is to say that situations function as concrete representations for the information they
carry.
What information actually arises from a situation is function of the agent’s interpretive
frame.4
Information in this sense cannot be “reduced to” or be mereologically considered a “part
of” any representation of that information, and is assumed to be built up from discrete
“items of information” known as infons. Infons are discrete in Dretske’s sense of digital
information [Dretske, 1983].
The basic logical form of information —and as such of an infon— is that of an object
having or not having a certain property. The general logical form of an infon is:
≪ R, a1, . . . , an, 1≫ or ≪ R, a1, . . . , an, 0≫
where R is an n–place relation and a1, . . . , an are objects appropriate for R. What kinds
of objects can fill the a1, . . . , an roles is a function of
1. how an agent “carves out” the world into “manageable pieces” —i.e. her scheme of
identification;
2. the type of the relation R.
Situation Theory also provides a mathematical construct called abstract situation to model
real situations within its mathematical framework.
4An example from Devlin’s book (Originally presented by Barwise in [Barwise, 1986]) makes vivid the
contingent relationship between a situation, some information, and the constraint an agent is attuned to.
Imagine a person coming across a tree stump in a forest —a situation. If she is “aware of the relationship
between the number of rings in a tree trunk and the age of the tree [a natural law constraint ] the stump can
provide her with the age of the tree when it fell [certain information]” [Devlin, 1995]. If she is not aware of
the relationship between the number of rings in a tree trunk and the age of the tree, she cannot obtain the
information that the tree was of a particular age when it fell. However, if she is attuned to other constraints,
she can obtain other information from the same situation —e.g. if she recognises the kinds of bark of the
tree, then “the stump can provide the information as of what type of tree it was, its probable height, shape,
leaf pattern, and so on” [Devlin, 1995].
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“There is an intuitive sense in which, to every real situation s, there corresponds
a particular abstract situation, namely the set {σ|s |= σ}” [Devlin, 1995].
An abstract situation is a (potentially partial) model of a real situation. It is a state of
affairs modeled as the set of infons.
By being partial models, abstract situations give the freedom to capture only aspects
relevant to the particular analysis and facilitate “extensive mathematical modeling” [Devlin,
2006].
The freedom of construing abstract situation out of any set of infon can in fact lead to
abstract situations that do not correspond to any situation in the real world. From an
ontological perspective, abstract situations —being logical objects— describe state of affairs
that might, or might not, obtain through a concrete situation.
Devlin’s work provides both fundamental concepts, such as the notion of a situation, es-
sential to the analysis presented here, and the cognitive–based and agent–driven approach
towards “information flow” that grounds how we define requirements for successful commu-
nication.
2.4 Fundamental primitive kinds
A preliminary step for a throughout conceptual analysis of a domain —e.g. the digital preser-
vation domain— is individuating foundational categories of things that will help consistently
describing the domain of interest.
We provide therefore a simple set of foundational primitives useful to proceed with our
conceptual analysis of information preservation. This set is based on the fundamental kinds
identified within the Basic Representation Model (BRM) [Wickett et al., 2012] and comple-
mented with additions from the Situation Theory ontology presented by Keith Devlin in his
book “Logic and Information” [Devlin, 1995].
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In this context, we consider an object to be any discrete individual in the world, one having
certain unity and identity criteria that allow for its discrimination, possible individuation,
and reference among other individuals.5 When not specified otherwise, we will use the terms
“object” and “entity” interchangeably.
In order to ensure consistency, we provide a simple set of fundamental kinds of objects
that represent traditional categorical distinctions commonly applied in formal ontology and
common sense discourse. The inclusion or otherwise of a particular kind in the ontology
is functional to the modeling scope —i.e. provide a conceptual framework to effectively
describe how information is represented, communicated and possibly preserved. Therefore,
no commitment is taken on the ‘true nature of reality’.
At the top level we distinguish between three kinds of concrete objects and three kinds of
abstract objects.
2.4.1 Concrete objects
The three kinds of concrete objects are: material object, event, and situation.
Material object Something is a material object if it is an amount of patterned matter
and energy [Sandore and Unsworth, 2010,Wickett et al., 2012]. Examples of material
objects are physical hard drives and other hardware components. Material objects are
typically understood as being wholly present at any time they exist [Casati and Varzi,
2010].
Event Something is an event if it occurs through time —i.e. it takes up time and persists
by having different parts (or “stages”) at different times. Examples of concrete events
are: a particular football game or a particular uttering of a sentence.
5For more on the notion of object, see the entry ‘Object’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/
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Situation Something is a situation if it is a temporally and spatially located structured
part of the world. Situations involve material objects, events, and relationships among
them, but any given situation is more then the sum of the objects, events, and rela-
tionships involved.
2.4.2 Abstract objects
The three kinds of abstract objects are propositional content, symbol structure, and state of
affairs :
Propositional Content Something is a proposition if it is possible to believe or doubt it.
A proposition is also typically understood as the language independent meaning of a
sentence and the bearer of truth value.
Symbol Structure Something is a symbol structure if it is an abstract arrangement of
symbols (individual symbol being an atomic symbol structure). Examples of abstract
objects that can serve as symbol structures include graphs, relations, and sequences,
along with more familiar kinds of symbol structures like strings of characters or sen-
tences.6
State of Affairs Something is state of affairs if it is a way things might be. State of affairs
in this sense closely relate to the notion of proposition: the sentence ‘the cat is on his
mat’ is not only said to express the proposition that the cat is on his mat, but also to
describe the state of affairs of the cat being on his mat. In fact, there are similarities
between states of affairs and propositions. Propositions are true or false; states of
affairs obtain or not.
These primitives will be referenced and utilized throughout the analysis that follows, in
particular in Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7, and be reiterated when appropriate.
6See [Wickett et al., 2012].
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CHAPTER 3
THE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF
PRESERVATION
3.1 Introduction
The notion of preserving digital information is fundamental in the broad digital and data
stewardship agendas [Task Force on Archiving of Digital Information et al., 1996,Duerr et al.,
2004]. Definitions of digital preservation and digital curation directly appeal to this idea.
Expressions like “preserving digital information” [Hedstrom, 1997,Waugh et al., 2000,Chen,
2001] or “maintaining digital information” [CCSDS, 2002,Webb, 2003] are routinely used
in the literature and scholarly discourse to refer to key objectives in the stewardship of our
scientific and cultural digital heritage.1
Despite wide acceptance and routine use, the notion of preservation is still problematic in
its application to digital artefacts. Perhaps this is not surprising.
What is surprising though, is that there has been so little effort to provide this notion,
both fundamental and problematic, with a precise and rigorous formal definition.
In this chapter we will demonstrate that the lack of a formal analysis of digital preservation
is indeed problematic, and this is primarily because the apparent parallels with physical
preservation are misleading. Paradigms of traditional ‘physical’ preservation fail to deliver
an appropriate account of what preservation really means in a digital context. Although some
attempt has been made within the digital stewardship community to provide more adequate
accounts of what digital preservation really entails [Ross, 2012]— misleading metaphors still
1See also [Yakel, 2007].
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pervade the scholarly discourse in digital preservation.
What follows in this chapter are first steps towards a conceptual analysis of the notion
of preservation, its relation with information, and the issues in its application in a digital
context. We show that the traditional notion of material preservation only metaphorically
applies to information and, consequently, cannot guide us at all in an analysis of digital
preservation. In addition, the same strategy is adopted to demonstrate that, even apart from
conceptual difficulties, preservation is not the best lens for characterizing the requirements
for long–term digital stewardship.
3.2 What ‘preservation’ does mean
Dictionaries define ‘preservation’ as the “process of preserving something” and “the state of
being preserved”. The term derives from the verb ‘to preserve’,2 defined as:
A1. “maintain (something) in its original or existing state”, A2. “retain (a condi-
tion or state of affairs)”, A3. “keep from harm or injuries” (Oxford dictionaries3)
Both senses of preservation —the former sense of emphasising an intentional process and
the latter emphasizing the results of such process— are addressed in the definitions of preser-
vation developed within the library and archival communities.
Dictionary definitions seem to imply the following account of material preservation:
MP0 x is preserved from time t1 and time t2 if and only if x exists at time t1 and x exists
at time t2
This account, however, does not capture certain intuitions with respect to preservation
practices: it is not enough for the material thing to exist. The thing undergoing preservation
2The verb “to preserve” originated from the Latin verb “praeservare”: from prae- ‘before, in advance’ +
servare ‘to keep’.
3Entry “preserve” at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/preserve.
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should also not loose certain properties, the ones that are considered essential for its identity
as a particular object and are required to support its specific function.
If we look at definitions of preservation developed within the library and archives com-
munity, this perspective consistently emerges.
3.2.1 Definitions of preservation: the material paradigm
The first two definitions refer and apply to physical objects traditionally preserved in libraries
and archives. For these reasons, we call them material definitions :
[D1] “1. The professional discipline of protecting materials by minimizing chem-
ical and physical deterioration and damage to minimize the loss of information
and to extend the life of cultural property - 2. The act of keeping from harm, in-
jury, decay, or destruction, especially through noninvasive treatment.” (Glossary
of Archival and Records Terminology [Pearce-Moses, 2012])
or
[D2] “The overall package of administrative and/or practical measures, such as
boxing, good housekeeping, careful handling and environmental control, which
ensure the survival of documents without specialist intervention. Conservation
and restoration procedures are part of a preservation policy.” (UNESCO [Boston,
1998])
These definitions of preservation imply the existence of a material object. Successful
preservation is described as “minimiz[ing] the loss of information and extending the life of
cultural properties” and “survival of documents”. In order to achieve successful preservation,
“practical measures” must be established to ensure the protection of the material against
potential decay. There is a strong alignment between these definitions and the dictionary
definitions of the term ‘preservation’. Preserving an object in the literal sense of preservation
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seems to imply that an object is preserved when it persists through time without relevant
changes in its significant characteristics, where significance is defined with respect to a
particular community of stakeholders against which successful presentation is assessed.
It also implies —at least when the verb ‘to preserve’ is used in the active voice— that the
object persists not by chance, but because procedures have been established to ensure and
assess its persistence.
A formal definition of this notion might be:
MP1 A physical object x is preserved from time t1 to time t2, relative to stakeholder
community CS, if and only if for all φ, if φ is a property of x that is significant for CS,
and x has φ at t1, than x has φ at t2
This account of preservation certainly applies to material objects —objects that can change,
be damaged, or decay— and focuses on the materiality of library and archival resources.
We make several observations about MP1. First, it relativizes preservation to particular
communities that determine which properties of an object are significant or important and
therefore should be retained by an object undergoing preservation. This means that an
object may be preserved with respect to one community, but not another. Second, once
a particular community is identified, preservation appears to be a binary determination —
an object is either preserved or it isn’t— and there is a high bar: all properties that are
significant should be retained by a successfully preserved object. Finally, we note that this
definition of preservation does not require intent to preserve.
This is a sense of preservation that obviously requires that a preserved object continues
to exist (x has the same referent at t1 and t2). While it does not explicitly allow that an
object can fail to be preserved and yet continue to exist, that is nevertheless a plausible
background assumption.
The information library and archive materials carry (or are supposed to carry) does not
directly enter into the equation at this level: there appears to be an implicit assumption that
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preserved objects can, all other things being equal, fulfill their intended informing functions.
3.2.2 Definitions of preservation: the transitional paradigm
Whereas the material accounts of preservation foreground what is constant over time, the
definitions provided by the Online Dictionary of Library and Information Science and Inter-
PARES present a very interesting shift in terminology that foregrounds intentional change
as an intrinsic part of preservation, accommodating the practice of media conversion and
reformatting. For this reason, we call them transitional.
[D3] “Prolonging the existence of library and archival materials by maintain-
ing them in a condition suitable for use, either in their original format or in a
form more durable, through retention under proper environmental conditions or
actions taken after a book or collection has been damaged to prevent further
deterioration.” (ODLIS [Reitz, 2004b])
and
[D4] “The whole of the principles, policies, rules and strategies aimed at pro-
longing the existence of an object by maintaining it in a condition suitable for
use, either in its original format or in a more persistent format, while leaving
intact the object’s intellectual form.” (InterPARES 2 Terminology Database [In-
terPARES, 2013])
The ODLIS definition, while suggesting traditional means intended to preserve a (physical)
object against change (e.g. damage or decay), allows for intentional changes in the “format”
or “form” of an object when a new form would be “more durable”.
The InterPARES definition shifts even more from the previous ones. The goal here is to
prolong the existence of an object (of unspecified type) by maintaining it “in its original
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format4 or in a more persistent format, while leaving intact the object’s intellectual form”5
[InterPARES, 2013].
Although the accounts presented in the ODLIS and InterPARES definitions are familiar
and perhaps, at some level, even plausible, it is difficult to understand them literally. What
does it mean for an object to be in one format or another? What sort of thing is it, exactly,
that can be preserved if moved from its original format to another format, but might not be
preserved if this transformation is not made? What exactly is this “intellectual form” that
might or might not remain “intact” across the transformation? InterPARES does provide a
discussion but it is not immediately evident how to understand these concepts from a formal
perspective.
Notwithstanding the unclear ontological status of such objects and materials, it appears
that both the InterPARES [InterPARES, 2013] and ODLIS [Reitz, 2004b] definitions are
clearly engaged with the hard problem of describing a different sort of preservation, one that
moves beyond the preservation of the original physical artefact.
What exactly then does preservation really entail for InterPARES? And what kinds of
things can be objects of preservation in this sense?
While the ontological status of the material [Reitz, 2004b] and object [InterPARES, 2013]
mentioned above is unclear, we can attempt a provisional formalization. Assuming that the
original format of something x to be preserved reflects a suitable condition for its use by a
community of stakeholders CS, we might say that:
TP1 An object x is preserved between time t1 and time t2 if and only if x has format y at
t1, x has format z at t2 and y is intellectual-form-equivalent to z with respect to x.
As well as the problem of defining “format”, “intellectual form”, and intellectual-form-
equivalent for objects, there is the related problem of determining what sort of objects these
4Italics by the author of this dissertation.
5Italics by the author of this dissertation.
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are that are being preserved via the management of equivalent formats. It seems unlikely that
all of these objects are particular material objects. Potential candidate categories might be
abstract objects such as content or information —or, alternatively, abstract representations
of some content or information, such as a text— where change is admitted in the physical
carrier that realizes such abstract object. Has format, on this account, is intended as a
relationship between the abstract object to be preserved (e.g. some information) and a
particular material carrier (e.g. a paper document).
Despite the potential variation in the level of abstraction, a possible approach in this
sense is to situate our x (at least for library materials) at one of the levels described by the
FRBR Group 1 entities. Depending on the preservation intent and expectations, and given
a material carrier (an individual situated at the FRBR Item level), x might be understood
as a) a particular work ; b) an expression of such a work (such as a particular text); or even
c) a manifestation (when presentational aspects are considered).
The approach we are taking here, appealing to the relational notion of equivalence, also
reflects a different, yet related, approach to understand (and describe) library material.
Elaine Svenonious, in her influential book The intellectual foundations of information orga-
nization [Svenonius, 2000], adopts a set theoretic approach where the notion of equivalence
plays a central role in understanding how library materials can be effectively described and
organized.
Even when digital preservation is not about preserving the digital counterpart of library
material, related questions regarding levels of abstraction arise within the digital preservation
paradigm discussed next, where the notions of information and content explicitly appear.
3.2.3 Definitions of preservation: the digital paradigm
Consider the following definitions of digital preservation:
[D5] “The process of maintaining, in a condition suitable for use, materials
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produced in digital formats, including preservation of the bit stream and the
continued ability to render or display the content represented by the bit stream.”
(ODLIS [Reitz, 2004a])
[D6] “The act of maintaining information, in a correct and independently Un-
derstandable form, over the Long Term.” (OAIS Glossary of terms [CCSDS,
2002])
[D7] “The active management of digital content over time to ensure ongoing
access.” (Library of Congress NDIIPP program)
[D8] “The series of managed activities necessary to ensure continued access to
digital materials for as long as necessary. [. . . ] all of the actions required to main-
tain access to digital materials beyond the limits of media failure or technological
change.” (Digital Preservation Coalition )
While preservation continues to be the definiendum, when we compare these definitions
to the material and transitional ones, the shift in terminology and concepts is quite vivid:
digital preservation is now about ensuring access to information, content, and (digital) ma-
terials, not about ensuring the existence or integrity of a physical object.
Despite this shift, the term ‘preservation’ also continues to appear in expressions like
‘preserving a digital object’ or ‘preserving digital information’ that are widely adopted within
the digital preservation literature.
Unfortunately, while the material and, to a certain extent, transitional definitions of
preservation directly reflect key features of our shared understanding of the term and give
a relatively simple account of what successful preservation entails, the definitions of digital
preservation presented above appeal to notions that do not provide a familiar, let alone
precise, account of what digital preservation is, or how to recognize success.
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What do we mean by “maintaining, in a condition suitable for use, materials produced
in digital formats”? What is it to “maintain access to digital materials”? What about
“maintaining information, in a correct and Independently Understandable form”?
These kinds of definitions do not support any immediate attempt to derive a more formal
account of what preservation means in a digital context. To see this, note for example that
the concepts inMP1 are relatively simple. How could a comparably precise formal definition
be provided using concepts like maintaining or access? Moreover, these definitions do not
provide an account of what digital material or information are, accounts that are necessary
in order to identify successful preservation.
Let’s consider then what kinds of things can be, and are, literally preserved in a digital
preservation context.
3.3 Conclusion
Does preservation really apply in a digital context? Although there are well–known puzzles
regarding the identity of physical objects [Haslanger and Kurtz, 2006], there is no doubt
that the notion of preservation has certainly rather well understood implications with re-
spect to material objects, and assumes that those objects can survive not only losing and
gaining properties, but also the rearrangement and even loss of physical parts. Preservation
here should be distinguished from conservation: “conservation counters existing damage, as
distinguished from preservation, which attempts to prevent damage”.6
Physical objects can be damaged, decay, and, more generally, are by their nature prone to
change over time. Therefore, when the targets of preservation are physical objects —such
as the traditional physical library and archival materials collected within the walls of library
and archive facilities— the action of preservation may be applied and is, indeed, required
in order to prolong their existence through time. Definitions of preservation following the
6See http://www2.archivists.org/glossary/terms/c/conservation.
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material paradigm certainly reflect this notion.
However, as recognised early on by the digital preservation community, the continuity of
physical components does not seem to be relevant, at least in the same way, to the identity
of digital objects.7
While a hardware infrastructure is required to access and interact with digital materials,
no particular hardware component (e.g. a particular hard drive) is typically understood
to be an essential component of any digital material. This is reinforced by the common
assumption that the same digital material (e.g. a digital document, an e-book, a web page
etc.) can be multiply and repeatedly ‘copied’ over different media devices. Even considering
cases where the bits cannot be migrated to new physical media — e.g. video game cartridges
where the source is not open— this is a contingent fact, not an essential characteristic of the
digital material itself.
In fact, digital preservation efforts many times involve the deliberate migration to new
physical media: digital preservation is “plagued by the short [physical] media life” [Chen,
2001] because “storage media, such as disks, tapes and cartridges, decay relatively rapidly
compared to other media” [Heslop et al., 2002] that have been traditionally used to carry
information (e.g. paper, parchment, papyrus, etc.).
If material objects involved in access, use, and interaction with digital objects do not
directly participate in their identity —it is common intuition that same digital object can be
replicated on different storage media and be accessed in different technology environments—
then what is it that must be ‘preserved’ or ‘maintained’ in order to ‘ensure continuous access
to digital materials’?
An answer typically considered legitimate, if not complete, is that we need to preserve the
bits or preserve information. These two perspectives are discussed in the following chapter.
7The term ‘digital object’ is used at this point in its colloquial underspecified sense. No commitment over
its ontological kind is assumed, other than the intuitive notion that digital objects are not physical objects.
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CHAPTER 4
PRESERVING THE BITS AND PRESERVING
INFORMATION
4.1 Introduction
We saw in the previous chapter how definitions of preservation evolved to fit evolving con-
cepts in the preservation community, beginning with the na¨ıve version of material preser-
vation and proceeding to the focus on maintaining access. Before going on to examine the
sophisticated influential theories of digital preservation in Chapter 5, we should take a closer
look at the notion of preserving the bits and the notion of preserving information. Both of
these concepts continue to play significant roles in the preservation discourse.
4.2 What ‘preserving the bits’ does mean
The Library of Congress National Digital Stewardship Alliance considers bit preservation
the first tier of its preservation levels :
as one moves up each of the tiers from Level 1 to Level 4, one is moving from the
basic need to ensure bit preservation towards broader requirements for keeping
track of digital content and being able to ensure that it can be made available
over longer periods of time.1
Consider the need to preserve a recorded bit sequence of interest, and represent that bit
sequence in new media with some warrant of authenticity and integrity [Giaretta et al., 2009]
1See http://www.digitalpreservation.gov/ndsa/.
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in some sense of those concepts. Even here, at this relatively low ‘physical’ level, we already
encounter conflict with the metaphor of preserving the relevant characteristics of a physical
object: there is no (literal) sense in speaking of ‘preserving’ a bit sequence as if it were the
sort of object that is subject to corruption. The particular bit sequence that is involved in
the process is essentially a sequence of 1s and 0s,2 an abstract symbol structure that can be
repeatedly and multiply instantiated in various physical media.
If properly performed, copying a DVD–ROM —i.e. “burning” a new DVD–ROM with
the same relevant physical characteristics as the original one— creates a completely new
inscription or new instantiation of exactly the same (set of) bit sequence(s). The persistence
of bit sequences is ensured by their fundamental nature as repeatable abstracta (rather than
concrete physical objects): they are objects that are not created and cannot change, or be
damaged or destroyed. Therefore preservation, in its literal sense, is neither required nor
possible.
The expression ‘preserving the bits’ appears to be a linguistic convention shorthanding a
more complex set of assumptions: bit preservation implies preserving an analog arrangement
of physical material from which a computer can derive a signal of some sort that by relevant
conventions is given a digital interpretation.
4.2.1 Preserving the bits: an account
Following the premise above, we can provide an account of bit preservation that does not
appeal to the literal sense of the term ‘preservation’.
At a high level of generality, bit preservation means enabling the possibility for the same
(set of) bit sequence(s) to be discriminated at different points in time, and, potentially,
across changes in the underlying storage technology.
2More precisely, a bit sequence is an abstract mathematical object: it is a sequence, a function having as
domain the set of natural numbers and as codomain the set {0,1}.
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By discrimination we mean here that, in virtue of certain physical arrangements in the
machine, some abstract patterns are recognized.
On this account, preservation involves an active discrimination process that can only
happen at run–time when a digital environment (DE) is involved. From a high–level, a DE
can be understood as a complexion involving a set of interconnected hardware and software
components.3 At run time a DE takes up an agentive role (called here machine agent)
with respect to the processes happening within DE. These processes are enabled when, at
run time, software components become available providing the rules against which a DE
operates.
Certain configurations of hardware and software components within a DE are recognized
at run time as performing a persistent storage function.
Given sets of interpretive rules IF1 and IF2 (i.e. two interpretive frames [Dubin et al.,
2011]) applied in the process, we can derive the following non–literal account of bit preser-
vation (BP), where bit preservation is understood as possible bit discrimination:
BP A bit sequence x is preserved between time t1 and time t2 if and only if
there exists a DE such that:
1. there is a persistent storage ps1 recognised as part of DE at time t1 such
that it is possible for DE to discriminate x from y when IF1 is applied;
2. there is persistent storage ps2 part of DE at time t2 such that it is possible
for DE to discriminate x from z when IF2 is applied;
3. (2) happens because ps1 is intended to realize x in DE according to IF1 at
t1 and ps2 is intended to realize the same x in DE according to IF2 at t2.
No assumption here is made on whether ps1 and ps2 are different persistent storage.
3No assumption here is made on the way hardware and software components are related and connected:
a DE can be in this sense a local machine, but also a distributed cloud service, a regional cluster, or a
client/server architecture where hardware and software components interoperate via network connections.
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The intentionality in clause (3) in intended to capture an active preservation intent : x
can be recognised in DE at time t2 not by chance but because established procedures are in
place: ps2 is physically arranged in such a way that is ‘bit-equivalent’ to ps2 with respect to
x when, respectively, IF2 and IF1 are applied in the discrimination process.
The possibility in clauses (1) and (2) is not logical possibility nor metaphysical or nomo-
logical possibility, but a more colloquial sense of possibility connected with the capability of
technical environments.
This account of preservation as potential discrimination is by definition potential. Actual
preservation can only be assessed at run time: the possibility becomes actuality only when
the intended bit sequence x is discriminated within DE.
It is worth noting that there is no certainty of successful bit preservation other than in
the moment when the discrimination process happens. This implies that between time t1
(the time when x entered preservation) and a later time t2 (the time when preservation is
assessed) we can only claim that procedures have been established (if any) that lower the
threats for an actual future discrimination of the same bit sequence x.
It should not come as a surprise that, in the latest years, management practices in digital
preservation have drawn heavily from risk management as a methodology [Lee et al., 2002,
Strodl et al., 2007,Becker et al., 2009,Barateiro et al., 2010,Ross, 2012]: we are not dealing
with certainty but with possibility.
4.2.2 Does preservation apply to the bits?
The lesson learned here is that there is no literal bit preservation. Preserving the bits is a
metaphor that can only be explained in terms of contingent relationships between material
objects (e.g. a persistent storage) and abstract objects (such as a bit sequence) with respect
to an agent capable to properly recognise such relationship. From this perspective, rou-
tine auditing procedures —involving checks on successful bit discrimination— are the only
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method to assess successful preservation over time.
Understanding bit preservation as potential discrimination also helps to explain recurring
expressions such as ‘bit rotting’ or ‘bit corruption’. The change (rotting, corruption, etc.)
does not happen at the abstract bit sequence level but at the physical storage media level.
Simply, the is realized by relationship between the intended bit sequence and a storage
situation ceases to hold (for example in virtue of unintended physical changes in a storage
media device) and a different bit sequence (or no bit sequence at all) is realized for the
processing agent in place.
This basic perspective on bit preservation, however, does not present the complete picture
of digital preservation challenges.
Bit level preservation is a mean, not the goal, in digital stewardship. As suggested by the
OAIS definition of digital preservation, successful digital preservation is about “maintaining”
or “preserving” information. The concept of information preservation, however, appears to
be as challenging as bit preservation.
4.3 What ‘preserving information ’ does mean
Understanding what preserving information means requires some preliminary observations
on the notion of information itself.
4.3.1 A preliminary perspective on information
The concept of information has been the object of extensive study in the field of Information
Science. Yet, there is still no agreement on what information really is. The issue has been
addressed from many different perspectives, ranging from the more ‘practical’ or ‘operational’
—where the concept of information is only appealed to and not necessarily analytically
described— to the more theoretical ones —where information is attempted to be precisely
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described as a kind of thing. Comprehensive studies have tried to capture and review the
different perspectives and approaches in a systematic way (e.g. [Capurro and Hjørland,
2005]).
Despite the various accounts of what information might be, there are practical reasons to
position the notion of information at the abstract propositional level, following a strategy
similar to those adopted to explain related concepts like meaning and knowledge.
This strategy defines the notion of information in relation with scenarios where an agent
is informed that p, and where p is the information content that the agent is presented with
as a result.
Consider the following examples: Claudia, a fictional character, participates in ordinary
situations where information, in its intuitive sense, appears to be involved. These examples
shows how Claudia obtains the same information in different ways.
A Claudia engages a Chicago Transportation Authority (CTA) officer in a conversation to
obtain information about buses to downtown. When Claudia asks the officer, the officer
informs Claudia that the bus 147 to downtown leaves at 4:15PM (some information);
B Claudia picks at the bus station a CTA bus schedule printed brochure. By ‘reading’
the brochure, Claudia is informed that the bus 147 to downtown leaves at 4:15PM
(some information);
C Claudia ‘opens’ a digital version (e.g. a digital brochure in PDF format) of the CTA
bus schedule on her computer. By ‘reading’ the digital brochure on screen Claudia is
informed that the bus 147 to downtown leaves at 4:15PM (some information).
In these examples, Claudia engages with the external world with her senses, and from
her experience of the world she comes to stand in a particular relationship with something
—namely that the bus 147 to downtown leaves at 4:15PM— that is about part of the world.
This something, we name it p, is what we colloquially call information.
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Intuitively p is something that can be believed or doubted and that it is either true or
false. It also a thing that is independent of the specific informing situation Claudia might be
involved in: Claudia can be presented with the same p under different circumstances where
p is represented and communicated differently.
For these reasons, we position the notion of information, ontologically, at the propositional
content level.
However, it is not the case that any propositional p is information per se, and not every
proposition ‘in the wild’ is information. A propositional p becomes information when partic-
ipating in an informing situation, where an agent, such as Claudia, is informed that p. On
this account, being information is a contingent role that p might play, but being information
is not an essential property of any p.
Information can then be defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Information) p is information at time t1 if and only if p is a proposition
and there is an agent a (such as a person) that is informed that p at time t1.
A proposition is defined in the classical way:
Definition 2 (Proposition) p is a proposition
def
= it is possible for someone to believe
p.
Information–as–proposition is therefore an object of abstract sort.
In order for an agent to be presented with a particular p there is always an interpretation
process in place where specific rules and conventions are applied. This process always involves
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objects that are concrete —and therefore can be object of sensory perception— that function
as representations for that p.
In our examples, a spoken utterance (Example A), a material object (Example B), and an
output on screen (Example C) function as different representations of the same p.
A similar perspective on information is the foundation of one of the most influential models
developed within the digital preservation community: the Open Archival Information System
(OAIS) Reference Model [CCSDS, 2002].
The OAIS Information Model is the specific component of the OAIS Reference Model that
models the requirements for information access and preservation.
Following, we discuss the OAIS Information Model and provide some observations about
its insights and issues in the lens of this account of information. From these observations we
will draw some preliminary conclusion on the notion of information preservation.
4.3.2 The OAIS Information Model
Defined by recommendation CCSDS 650.0-B-1 of the Consultative Committee for Space Data
Systems [CCSDS, 2002] and corresponding to ISO 14721:2003, the OAIS Reference Model
directly engages with the problem of relating information with the bits via its Information
Model.
The OAIS Information Model is the specific component of the OAIS Reference Model that
models how information is “handled by an OAIS” [CCSDS, 2002, Page 4-1], the assumption
being
“Data interpreted using its Representation Information yields Information” [CCSDS,
2002, Page 2-4]
where information is defined as:
“Any type of knowledge that can be exchanged. In an exchange, it is represented
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by data. An example is a string of bits (the data) accompanied by a descrip-
tion of how to interpret the string of bits as numbers representing temperature
observations measured in degrees Celsius (the Representation Information).”
Accompanying the text is the diagram in Figure 4.1 that represents relevant entities and
relationships:
Data 
Object
Information 
Object
Representation 
Information
Interpreted
using its Yields
Figure 4.1: Obtaining Information from Data in OAIS
Data is modeled in OAIS as a Data Object :
“The Data Object may be expressed as either a physical object (e.g., a moon
rock) together with some Representation Information, or it may be expressed
as a digital object (i.e., a sequence of bits) together with the Representation
Information giving meaning to those bits.” [CCSDS, 2002, Page 4-20]
An Information Object is defined as:
“A Data Object together with its Representation Information” [CCSDS, 2002,
Page 1-12]
where Representation Information is intended as:
“The information that maps a Data Object into more meaningful concepts.”
[CCSDS, 2002, Page 1-14]
Preserving a data object is necessary but not sufficient: we need to preserve also the in-
terpretive means —i.e. the Representation Information— such that the user of a designated
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community can properly access information in a meaningful way.4 Representation Informa-
tion in this sense constitutes the complex set of interpretive frames [Dubin et al., 2011] that,
comprehensively, maps the bits to the information a user should be presented with.
Consider the following examples from OAIS:
“An example of Representation Information for a bit sequence which is a FITS file
might consist of the FITS standard which defines the format plus a dictionary
which defines the meaning in the file of keywords which are not part of the
standard.” [CCSDS, 2002, Page 1-14]
or
“Another example is JPEG software which is used to render a JPEG file; ren-
dering the JPEG file as bits is not very meaningful to humans but the software,
which embodies an understanding of the JPEG standard, maps the bits into
pixels which can then be rendered as an image for human viewing.” [CCSDS,
2002, Page 1-14]
These examples make vivid the OAIS approach, in particular:
1. information is “always expressed (i.e. represented) by some type of data” [CCSDS,
2002, Page 2.3], which is to say that information can only be accessed through a
representation of that information.
2. in order for a user to be presented with the intended information, an appropriate inter-
pretation of the data needs to happen, and such an interpretation is always governed
by an interpretive frame —a specific set of rules and conventions that map the in-
tended information to a representation. Such rules and conventions are modeled in
4The OAIS recognises that we should also consider the background knowledge of the designated com-
munity and the representation information that needs to be preserved is complement of such background
knowledge. On the topic see also [Giaretta, 2008,Chowdhury, 2010,Strodl et al., 2007,Becker et al., 2009].
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OAIS as a combination of Representation Information and the background knowledge
of a designated community for which information should be ‘preserved’.
3. OAIS emphasises that successful preservation can only be assessed with respect to a
designated community of users: their capability and expectation need to fit into the
equation.
4.3.3 Does preservation really apply to information?
If information is essentially an entity of abstract propositional sort —and certainly OAIS
seems to agree when defines information as “Any knowledge that can be exchanged” [CCSDS,
2002]— preservation in its literal sense does not apply to information, nor it is required.
Similarly to bit preservation, we are facing a situation where the object to be preserved
cannot be damaged, destroyed, or decay. Similarly also, there is an interpretation process
that needs to happen.
Preserving information appears to be, in fact, a metaphorical expression, a sort of shortcut,
where a complex set of requirements needs to be satisfied in order for an agent to be presented
with an intended information p.
Interestingly, however, at least from the user perspective, bits are not directly involved
in this interpretation process —as suggested by Example C presented above where Claudia
engages with a digital brochure through an output on screen.
While, to a certain extent, we can understand the bits — a Data Object in OAIS— as
ultimately representing the information that a digital object is intended to carry for a user,
they do not express such information directly. In most cases,5 bit level representations do
not constitute meaningful representations at the user level —i.e. a bit level representation
is not the representation intended for user access, its “documentary form” [Duranti, 2005].
Bits need to be appropriately interpreted in order to provide access to objects of other
5Unless the object of analysis for a user is a particular bit sequences.
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sorts, and are these objects that are meaningful for human agents. Objects of the latter sort
are typically understood either as the digital counterpart of well understood information–
carrying material objects —where ‘digital’ is typically used as a prefix such as in digital
document, or digital picture— or other objects only recognized in the digital domain —e.g.
web page, video game, etc.
Terms like ‘digital document’, ‘e–book’, or ‘web page’ —or general terms such at ‘digital
material’ hardly denote objects at the bit sequence level and their reference, if any should
be accounted for.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we explored some plausible approaches to concepts of preservation and we
showed that preservation, in its literal sense, does not apply to bit sequences and information,
entities typically understood at targets of digital preservation efforts.
We also showed that the influential OAIS Reference Model [CCSDS, 2002] reflects these
conclusions, and adds further critical insights on the relationships between bit level repre-
sentations and information: access to information can only happen when a Data Object is
properly interpreted according to appropriate Representation Information.
OAIS, however, does not capture all the entities that appear to be involved in this interpre-
tation process. In particular, OAIS fails to capture the sort of entities users are engaged with
when they interact with digital materials, those entities that actually represent information
from the user perspective.
In the next chapter we discuss four different, yet related, conceptual perspectives that
attempt strategies to address these issues, drawing some conclusions about the actual nature
of digital materials and their function as information carriers.
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CHAPTER 5
PRESERVING ACCESS TO DIGITAL MATERIALS
5.1 Introduction
In the last chapter we explored some plausible approaches to a theory of preservation, noting
difficulties with na¨ıve accounts and laying the groundwork for an improved approach.
We have seen that, not only digital preservation is not bit preservation, but that bit
corruption is, strictly speaking, not possible. Similarly, we have seen that information is
also safe from corruption, and so it is hardly the proper object of preservation. Indeed, the
best contemporary theories of digital preservation do not focus on the preservation of any
sort of object, but rather on preserving access. But understanding what ‘preserving access’
means —and what is accessed and how— presents deep conceptual challenges.
In this chapter we explore in depth three influential theories of preservation.
5.2 Three approaches to digital preservation
Experiencing digital materials requires a combination of hardware and software: their access
is “mediated by technology” [Heslop et al., 2002].
“If the software for making sense of the bits (that is for retrieving, displaying, or
printing) is not available, then the information will be, for all practical purposes,
lost.” [Kuny, 1998]
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The relationship between bits and other objects that are useful and effective to charac-
terize the complex nature of digital objects has been extensively analyzed within the digital
preservation community. In the section we will focus on three conceptual approaches that
we consider extremely influential for their many insights: Thibodeau’s concept of a digital
object [Thibodeau, 2002], the InterPARES approach towards understanding digital records,
and the National Archives of Australia Performance Model [Heslop et al., 2002].
These works try to capture, beyond bit sequences, complementary aspects of what needs
to happen in a digital environment in order for users to access digital material in the form
“purportedly intended for user consumption” [Duranti, 2005].
5.2.1 Thibodeau’s concept of a digital object
Kenneth Thibodeau presented his concept of a digital object in a 2002 influential paper titled
“Overview of Technological Approaches to Digital Preservation and Challenges in Coming
Years” [Thibodeau, 2002].
According to Thibodeau, a digital object can only be explained in terms of other objects:
“All digital objects are entities with multiple inheritance; that is, the proper-
ties of any digital object are inherited from three classes. Every digital object
is a physical object, a logical object, and a conceptual object, and its proper-
ties at each of those levels can be significantly different. A physical object is
simply an inscription of signs on some physical medium. A logical object is an
object that is recognized and processed by software. The conceptual object is
the object as it is recognized and understood by a person, or in some cases rec-
ognized and processed by a computer application capable of executing business
transactions.”1 [Thibodeau, 2002]
1Thibodeau’s levels resemble closely the typical levels understood at the core of the notion of data
independence in the theory and practice of database management systems.
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The physical level represents the hardware layer in a digital environment, “inscription of
signs on a [physical] medium”:
“Basically, the physical level deals with physical files that are identified and
managed by some storage system. The physical inscription is independent of the
meaning of the inscribed bits.” [Thibodeau, 2002]
The logical level represents entities (such as abstract bit sequences, or higher level data
structures) that are recognised and processed “according to the logic of a software applica-
tion” [Thibodeau, 2002]:
“Once data are read into memory, the type of medium and the way the data
were inscribed on the medium are of no consequence. The rules that apply at
the logical level determine how information is encoded in bits and how different
encodings are translated to other formats; notably, how the input stream is
transformed into the system’s memory and output for presentation.” [Thibodeau,
2002]
The conceptual level captures the “presentation layer” or the characteristics of objects
such as those “we deal with in the real world” [Thibodeau, 2002]:
“[A conceptual object] is an entity we would recognize as a meaningful unit of
information, such as a book, a contract, a map, or a photograph. In the digital
realm, a conceptual object may also be one recognized by a business application,
that is, a computer application that executes business transactions.” [Thibodeau,
2002]
Thibodeau’s objects (conceptual, logical, physical) are FRBR-like and there is an almost
endemic tendency throughout information organization to see property inheritance between
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FRBR-like object classes. This is first identified in the Renear and Choi paper devoted to
the topic [Renear and Choi, 2006].
Despite the unfortunate use of the notion of inheritance,2 Thibodeau’s account of a digital
object provides many compelling insights into the nature of what we colloquially call digital
objects, how we access them, and what their preservation implies.
His notion of conceptual object is particularly interesting because it closely resembles
notions like digital material that repeatedly appear in definitions of digital preservation as
those objects “recognized and understood by a person”.
The following quotation summarized his perspective on the requirements for successful
digital preservation:
“The process of preserving digital objects is fundamentally different from that
of preserving physical objects such as traditional books or documents on paper.
2According to Thibodeau, an instance of the class digital object inherits properties from three distinct
classes: Physical Object, Logical Object, and Conceptual Object. This perspective presents some ontological
challenges. Can we really conceive an individual object that is at the same time, for example, an inscription
(in the physical sense of inscription) and the “data that is loaded into the memory” of a computing machine?
This seems quite unlikely.
Multiple inheritance is a common concept in knowledge representation and applies to a class of individuals
when the class is a subclass of (a subsumption relationship) multiple classes. As an example, consider the
class of all platypus (See ¡http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platypus¿). We can say that instances of the class
platypus inherit their properties from both the class of all mammals and the class of all egg-laying animals.
This means that a platypus instantiates all the characteristics associated essentially with both the class
mammal and the class egg-laying animal.
These problems of adopting a multiple inheritance approach can be made vivid by formalizing the sub-
sumption relationships in First Order Logic:
∀(x)(DigitalObject(x) > PhysicalObject(x)) &
(DigitalObject(x) > LogicalObject(x)) &
(DigitalObject(x) > ConceptualObject(x))
(5.1)
Any property φ of a superclass is inherited by each of its subclasses, therefore:
∀φ, (φ(PhysicalObject) > φ(DigitalObject)) &
(φ(LogicalObject) > φ(DigitalObject)) &
(φ(ConceptualObject) > φ(DigitalObject))
(5.2)
Considering his description of the individual classes and their characteristics —and notwithstanding any
interpretation of what a digital object really is— there no such individual thing that can possibly be at the
same time an instance of the three classes physical object, logical object, and conceptual object.
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To access any digital object, we have to retrieve the stored data, reconstituting,
if necessary, the logical components by extracting or combining the bit strings
from physical files, reestablishing any relationships among logical components,
interpreting any syntactic or presentation marks or codes, and outputting the
object in a form appropriate for use by a person or a business application. Thus,
it is impossible to preserve a digital document as a physical object. One can only
preserve the ability to reproduce the document. Whatever exists in digital storage
is not in the form that makes sense to a person or to a business application. The
preservation of an information object in digital form is complete only when the
object is successfully output. The real object is not so much retrieved as it
is reproduced by processing the physical and logical components using software
that recognizes and properly handles the files and data types.” [Thibodeau, 2002]
With this addendum:
“The process of digital preservation, then, is inseparable from accessing the ob-
ject. You cannot prove that you have preserved the object until you have re–
created it in some form that is appropriate for human use or for computer system
applications.” [Thibodeau, 2002]
While Thibodeau’s rich narrative captures familiar intuitions about the challenges we face
in digital preservation, it does not deliver a complete picture, leaving some foundational
questions unanswered.
While a physical object and a logical object can be safely understood, respectively, as an
object of concrete material kind and an object of abstract symbol structure kind, the notion
of conceptual object is less clear, ontologically.
A conceptual object is described both as “an object we deal with in the real world”
and an object that can be repeatedly “re–created” or “reproduced” in some “form that is
appropriate for human use or for computer system applications” [Thibodeau, 2002].
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This notion appears to share characteristics with both a repeatable abstraction that can
be multiply instantiated and a tangible material object that a user can directly experience
through her senses.
Both aspects should certainly be taken into consideration.
On one hand, a conceptual object appears to be something that is “encoded” in (or by)
a logical object and that “can be used by machine application”. Even without a precise
understanding of the encoding relationship, we can hardly conceive such an object to be a
material object.
On the other hand, a conceptual object appears to be something that users can directly
recognise and engage with: a thing a user can see, hear, etc., something like a “a book, a
contract, a map, or a photograph” [Thibodeau, 2002]. Thibodeau, however, certainly does
not refer to familiar material artefacts such as a (physical) book or a (physical) photograph in
his account, but to entities that share certain characteristics with their material counterpart.
What would be then this “real object [that] is not so much retrieved as it is reproduced by
processing the physical and logical components” and that is “in some form that is appropriate
for human use or for computer system applications” [Thibodeau, 2002]?
We are possibly dealing with a compound entity that requires further analysis to be
precisely defined.
While Thibodeau’s observation that “the process of digital preservation is inseparable from
accessing the [conceptual] object” seems to suggest that a preservation–as–access account
can be attempted, when we try to formalize such an account adopting his perspective, we
fall short.
If a conceptual object is an abstraction, what would be the concrete persistent object that
realizes it such that it is possible for a user to recognise it?
If a conceptual object is instead concrete, what sort of concrete entity is temporary, repro-
ducible still being the same, and dependant upon certain activity happening in a machine?
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The National Archives of Australia Performance Model engages with this issue in a com-
pelling way by appealing to the notion of a performance.
5.2.2 The NAA Performance Model
The National Archives of Australia Performance Model, developed in the context of the
Agency to Researcher Digital Preservation Project hosted at the National Archives Of Aus-
tralia and presented in a 2002 report titled “An Approach to the Preservation of Digital
Records” [Heslop et al., 2002], proposes a perspective that is apparently radically different
from the ones we previously presented.
The rationale for the NAA Performance Model is that
“Digital records challenge the idea that records are essentially objects for archivists
to preserve, arrange, store and make accessible” [Heslop et al., 2002].
In particular:
“[Digital records,] while fulfilling the same general business purpose [of paper
records], are mediated by technology, which means that to experience digital
records a person must have the right combination of hardware and software.
[. . . ] The experience of the object only lasts for as long as the technology and
data interact. As a result, each viewing of a record is a new ‘original copy’ of itself
- two people can view the same record on their computers at the same time and
will experience equivalent ‘performances’ of that record.” [Heslop et al., 2002]
According to them, digital records are “series of performances across time” [Heslop et al.,
2002] —a performance being defined as “what is rendered to the screen or to any other output
device”, but also ‘as ‘a combination of a source and a process”, or as “the collaboration of
the source and process” [Heslop et al., 2002]. Digital records are performances because they
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are “non stable artefacts” whose experience “last” only as long as “the technology and data
interact” [Heslop et al., 2002].
Source Performance Process Researcher 
Figure 5.1: NAA Performance model – source and process components
This characterization is contrasted with the nature of paper records, “original and unique
physical artefacts” that can be “experienced directly if [the researcher] can read the lan-
guage” and “can only be experienced at one place in time”.
In order to address the relation between “equivalent performances” and “same records”,
the concept of essence is introduced:
“The project team developed the concept of a record’s ‘essence’ as a way of
providing a formal mechanism for determining the characteristics that must be
preserved for the record to maintain its meaning over time. The performance
model demonstrates that digital records are not stable artefacts; instead they
are a series of performances across time. Each performance is a combination of
characteristics, some of which are incidental and some of which are essential to
the meaning of the performance. The essential characteristics are what we call
the ‘essence’ of a record.” [Heslop et al., 2002]
The NAA Performance Model introduces important yet challenging ideas that we can
summarize as follows:
1. The known fact that digital resources are always mediated by technology here justifies
the claim that “digital records are not stable artefacts” and that they last only when
certain circumstances are met —i.e. for as long as “the technology and data interact”
[Heslop et al., 2002].
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2. When those circumstances are met, we should be able to recreate “equivalent perfor-
mances” distinguishing between the essential characteristics of a record —those that
qualify its essence and therefore, must be present in equivalent performances— and
those that are contingent and not essential to the meaning of a record.
3. Each equivalent performance is a “view” of the same record, a “new original copy” that
multiple people should be able to experience at the same time.
The NAA Performance Model explicitly addresses the need for something concrete that
needs to experienced by a researcher in order access the essence of a record: a performance.
If performances are concrete objects, what kind of concrete objects are they?
From a technical perspective they might be described as a sequence of states in the ma-
chine, but this approach does not capture appropriately the user experiential perspective.
They appear to be objects spanning in place and time and whose identity conditions involve
both material objects (such as an output device) and event–like components (consider, as an
example, the performance of a digital movie); they are also objects potentially affected by
the user input and interaction with the digital environment in place (consider the variation in
different performances of a video game or other interactive media that are, in fact, essential
to game play).
If we consider again a digital environment DE, any particular performance produced in
DE at run time can be understood as a (potentially complex) situation part of DE itself
that exists until the appropriate process lasts.
Consider a parallel example. For a person watching a movie, the movie itself cannot
be reduced to the sum of its photograms: it is indeed perceived as an individual entity, a
continuum. For similar reasons, performances cannot be reduced to the sum of components
involved, being them physical objects and events, or to the sum of machine states. This
account is also in line with the notion of performance as adopted in fields such as performing
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arts and linguistics.3
Performances are situations that, while involving physical objects and events, are individ-
uated as whole individuals bearing unity and identity conditions by a user experiencing and
interacting with them.
When users engage with what we colloquially call digital objects, they do so by recognis-
ing, experiencing, and interacting with concrete performances (according to their sensory
perception of the world).
The notions of performance and essence together seem to capture many of the character-
istics that Thibodeau assigns to his conceptual object, distinguishing however between the
concrete objects that users experience, namely performances, and the characteristics that
objects of this sort need to share in order to be appropriate performances of the same record.
5.2.3 The InsPECT Project
A similar distinction and approach has driven the work of the The Investigating the Signif-
icant Properties of Electronic Content Over Time (InSPECT) Project4 [Knight, 2009].
As pointed out by Heslop [Heslop et al., 2002], the interpretation of the same source within
different digital environments can lead to the production of performances that are signifi-
cantly different —even if potentially equivalent from the perspective of certain communities
of users. InSPECT recognises this critical aspect when defining the notion of significant
3The notion of a performance is central and received proper attention and analysis in contexts different
from digital preservation: for example, performance in the performing art sense and performance in the
linguistics sense.
In the performing art sense,a performance is usually defined as “the act of performing” a musical play, a
stage drama , a live installation, etc. On this account, performances seem to be concrete particular events
in time.
An extensive ontological analysis of the concept of a performance has been carried out by Peggy Phelan
and presented in her book “Unmarked: the politics of performance” [Phelan, 2012].
According to Phelan, a performance is a non–repeatable act —“Performance in strict ontological sense is
nonreproductive [. . . ] they live in the present” [Phelan, 2012].
There is another sense of performance that is potentially relevant to our context: in a linguistics sense,
a performance is the “actual use of language in actual situations”. A linguistic performance is broadly
conceived as the production of an utterance of a sentence.
4See http://www.significantproperties.org.uk/.
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properties :
“[Significant properties are] the characteristics of digital objects that must be
preserved over time in order to ensure the continued accessibility, usability, and
meaning of the objects, and their capacity to be accepted as evidence of what
they purport to record.” [Knight, 2009]
This definition appeals to the following rationale:
“An assumption implicit in the OAIS Reference Model is that a single type of
Representation Information will exist for each Data Object that will be used to
recreate the Information Object. Although ideal, this does not reflect practical
experience of accessing a Data Object in a digital environment. As recognised
by the National Archives of Australia in its Performance Model, it may be more
accurate to recognise the existence of several Representation Information variants
for a single Data Object. The use of one Representation Information variant
may yield an Information Object that differs from that rendered by a second
Representation Information variant. The differences between the two recreations
may be considered minor or major dependent upon its influence upon the access,
use and interpretation of the Information Object.” [Knight, 2009]
The approach of InSPECT relativizes what successful preservation is: significance is de-
fined with respect of the resource under consideration, but also with respect to the expec-
tation and intent of stakeholders involved in the process. An approach very well captured
by Dapper and Farquart’s expression ‘significance is in the eye of the stakeholders’ [Dappert
and Farquhar, 2009].
The notion of performance really places the assessment of successful digital preservation
in the eyes (or ears, etc.) of users when they engage with technology. Similarly to bit–
level preservation, we are facing a situation where an agentive role is central to preservation
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assessment and there is no certainty of successful preservation if not in the moment when a
performance is produced and a user (of a designated community) engages successfully with
it recognizing the characteristics that constitute its essence.
In this sense, we are facing an account of preservation that resembles the transitional
account of preservation presented above, where successful preservation is assessed according
to an equivalence relation between concrete entities over time. The substantial difference
resides, however, in the ephemeral nature of performances. Performances, while concrete,
appear to be temporally–constrained, technology–dependant, and non–repeatable situation–
like objects. This implies that any individual performance is unique and ceases to exist
when specific processes at the machine level terminate: they do not persist in the same way
material objects do.
‘Preserving access to digital materials’ appears then to be a metaphorical expression for
‘producing equivalent performances over time’.
This approach, however, does not capture all the intuitions behind the way we talk about
digital objects, nor certain assumptions in digital preservation.
5.3 What ‘preserving access to digital materials’ does
mean
Let’s consider first the notion of digital material itself.
5.3.1 What digital materials are, after all
Expressions like the ‘same e-book is available in E-Pub and Mobi’, or again, ‘a digital docu-
ment is migrated from one file format to another’ appear to assume the existence of something
that is the same in different contexts, a thing that reflects Thibodeau’s notion of concep-
tual object, but not quite. As observed above, there is an unfortunate abstract/concrete
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conflation in the notion of conceptual object, partially solved by the notion of performance.
Terms like ‘digital document’ or ‘e–book’ or ‘video game’, however, do not refer to any
particular performance, nor, strictly speaking, to “a series of performances across time”.
Performances are concrete non–repeatable entities whereas, intuitively, the same e-book can
be read on different devices and the same video game can be played over and over again.
What sort of things are a video game or an e–book, essentially? What about objects that,
intuitively, belong to similar categories (such as digital documents or digital pictures) that
so often are identified as objects to be preserved?
There is an almost natural affinity between terms like ‘video game’, ‘e–book’, ‘digital
image’ and the notion of ‘digital material’ often found in the digital preservation literature,
one that suggests we cannot dismiss these intuitions completely.
We suggested above that performances are concrete situation–like objects : they are com-
plex entities involving material objects, events, and relationships among them. Objects like
video games, e-books etc. appear to be something like an abstract counterpart of their
respective specific performances.
For these reasons, we propose here to characterize the notion of digital material in terms
of abstract state of affairs5 which can obtain in multiple concrete situations.
Generally speaking, a state of affairs is a way things might be, and state of affairs can be
effectively understood as the abstract counterparts of concrete situations. We can also say
that, when a state of affairs obtains through a situation, that situation makes the state of
affairs actual.
Adopting Edward Zalta’s approach [Zalta, 1983], we say that states of affairs encode
properties and relationships, while concrete situations exemplify them.
A minimal state of affairs σ encodes an individual property φ. We can say that σ obtains
if an only if there is a situation s such that φ(s). Which is also to say that a situation s
5See ¡http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/¿.
57
makes a state of affairs σ actual if and only if s (minimally) exemplifies every property φ
that σ encodes.6
The notion of states of affairs, in this sense, closely relates to the notion of proposition:
the sentence “the cat is on his mat” is not only said to express the proposition that the cat
is on his mat, but also to describe the state of affairs of the cat being on his mat. In fact,
there are similarities between states of affairs and propositions. Propositions are true or
false; states of affairs obtain or not.7
On this account, a specific digital material can be understood as compound state of affairs
encoding all the properties and relationships that a performance appropriate for that digital
resource (i.e. a performance that makes the digital resource actual) must exemplify.
Consider a basic example about a digital textual document —i.e. a particular sort of digital
material. Given a symbol structure tx (the text), and interpretive frame IF , a variable
y ranging over temporal locations, and a variable x ranging over digital performances, a
digital textual document can be characterized, minimally, as the state of affairs encoding
the following relationship:
realizes(x, tx, IF, y)
To form the name of the digital material corresponding to the open formula, we bracket
the formula with double solidi:
//realizes(x, tx, IF, y))//.
This digital material obtains if and only if a digital performance s is produced at time t1
such that:
realizes(s, tx, IF, t1).
We believe that this notion of digital material as state of affairs captures precisely the
6We note here that logical compounds of state of affairs are themselves state of affairs. Any particular
situation can make actual more that one atomic state of affairs, or the logical compositions of them.
7The fact that a state of affair can be described by a sentence plays a central role in how states of affairs
can be modeled. For an account of the distinction between being and being modeled as see 2.7 in [Devlin,
1995].
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intuitions behind the use of terms like ‘e–book’ and ‘digital document’8 without negatively
affecting our practical intuitions about digital preservation —i.e. that preserving digital
materials means producing equivalent performances over time. For example, a particular
digital document encodes a series of characteristics that needs to be exemplified each time
a performance of that digital document is produced in order to provide the user with the
intended experience.
This approach is also in line with the idea that successful preservation can only be assessed
with respect to the expectations of a designated community of stakeholders. The notion of
significance [Giaretta et al., 2009,Dappert and Farquhar, 2009,Lynch, 2013] adopted in In-
SPECT attempts to capture these expectations in terms of characteristics that are significant
in order for preservation to be considered successful. We can say that the production of a
particular performance satisfies preservation requirements if and only if a produced perfor-
mance makes actual an intended state of affairs —namely, the state of affairs that encodes
all the individuals, properties, and relationships that have been identified as significant.
5.3.2 Preserving access to digital material: an account
Clearly, even on this account, traditional accounts of preservation do not apply: we are
dealing again with objects of abstract sort that require no preservation efforts on our part
to ensure their continued existence, or objects like performances that, while concrete, only
exist at run-time and therefore are inherently ephemeral.
As recognized early on by the InterPARES community:
“While the phrase “preserve an electronic record” is convenient and undoubtedly
will continue to be used, in many variations it is a shorthand expression that
8It also applies, we believe, to objects like digital pictures or video games that manifest characteristics
that cannot be reduced to propositional information, or representations of propositional information. The
caveat here is to properly model within the framework the characteristics that performances of these kinds
of material exemplify. The framework itself only models the relationship between performances and digital
materials, not the specific characteristics that they, respectively, exemplify and encode.
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belies reality. Empirically, it is not possible to preserve an electronic record: it
is only possible to preserve the ability to reproduce the record. That is because
it is not possible to store an electronic record in the documentary form in which
it is capable of serving as a record. There is inevitably a substantial difference
between the digital representation of the record in storage and the form in which
it is presented for use. It is always necessary to use some software to translate
the stored digital bits into the documentary form of the record.” [InterPARES,
2001]
While the focus of InterPARES are digital records, similar perspectives can be applied to
other digital stewardship scenarios.
Producing equivalent performances over time means producing over time performances
that make actual the same digital material, providing means for a user to access certain
information.
Preserving the requirements for producing equivalent performances, however —in In-
terPARES terms “preserve the ability to reproduce the record”— is again a misleading
metaphor: all the things involved in the production of a performance are either:
• objects of abstract kinds —for which preservation does not apply, nor is required— or
• material objects, like hardware components, that are in fact required to be replaced
over time.
A different approach, and the one espoused here, may consider these issues from an infor-
mation communication perspective.
Requirements to produce equivalent performances might be expressed in terms of require-
ments for certain information to emerge within a digital environment such that the machine
agent can produce appropriate performances according to that information.
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The general formalities of this process are not dissimilar to those that can be used to
describe the requirements for any agent to be presented with information. In fact, a related
perspective can also be applied to describe how information emerges for a human agent from
specific performances, more precisely describing how “a data object [i.e. the bits] interpreted
using its representation information yields information [for a user]”.
5.4 Conclusion
We have seen in this chapter how the insights from different yet related conceptual ap-
proaches to digital preservation contribute to a more consistent theory of what digital ma-
terials are and what it means to preserving access to them.
The next chapter will introduce a perspective on information based on influential infor-
mation and communication theories [Grice, 1957,Devlin, 1995]. The emerging framework
will be applied to provide a digital stewardship paradigm that avoid the several misleading
metaphors and category mistakes involved in the use of the term preservation.
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CHAPTER 6
THE CONTINGENT AND INTENTIONAL NATURE
OF COMMUNICATION
6.1 Introduction
Information, we argued in Chapter 4, is a thing that cannot be literally preserved and the
problem of preserving information can be more effectively tackled adopting a strategy that
confirms the intuition that preservation is about interpretation and access.
In Chapter 5 we discussed several influential attempts to develop this approach into a
comprehensive account of digital preservation. While these contained deep insights that
advanced our understanding, they also contained flaws that limited their achievement. The
notion of digital material has been clarified and a provisional account of preserving access
to digital material provided. The presented account involves, again, interpretation and
access processes, ultimately suggesting that many issues in digital preservation could be
more effectively described from a communication of information perspective.
This chapter elaborates on these topics in greater deal, addressing:
• the fundamental kinds of things that are involved in information representation and
the contingent relationships among them;
• the essential role agents play in establishing these relationship when involved in in-
forming scenarios where communication happens.
The emerging framework, informed by Keith Devlin’s work in Situation Theory [Devlin,
1995, Devlin, 2006], can be applied to all contexts where the flows of certain information
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content needs to be modeled, including those scenarios —such as those addressed in digital
stewardship— where communication is mediated by digital technology.
6.2 Representing information
Keith Devlin notes:
“The first thing to observe [about information] is that information is ‘carried’ or
‘arises from’ a representation. [. . . ] Without some form of representation there
can be no information. But just because the information cannot ‘exist’ without
the representation, it does not follow that the representaion is all there is —that
information is somehow contained in or part of the representation.” [Devlin,
1995]
We follow here a similar approach: the assumption is that we can only access information
in virtue of some form of representation of that information.
The notion of representation in the context of information, knowledge, and data represen-
tation, refers to the conventions for the arrangement of things in the world in such a way as
to enable information to be encoded and later decoded by suitable agents and systems.1
By levels of representation we mean those levels of abstraction identified in linguistics,
philosophy of language, and computer science that are useful to describe roles that concrete
and abstract entities play in the process of information communication.
Modeling these levels of abstraction has also proven to be effective to describe information–
carrying resources from an analytical perspective [IFLA Study Group on the Functional
Requirements for Bibliographic Records, 1998].
1This definition is adapted from here: http://guide.dhcuration.org/representation/.
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We distinguish here between concrete representations and symbolic representations, con-
tingent roles that might be played, respectively, by concrete and abstract objects2 in the
‘representation stack’ of propositional information.
Previous work by the Data Conservancy Data Concepts (DCDC) group at the University
of Illinois identified the kinds of things that might play these contingent roles and potential
relationships among them.
6.2.1 The Basic Representation Model
The Basic Representation Model (BRM) [Wickett et al., 2012] developed by the Data Con-
servancy Data Concepts (DCDC) group at the University of Illinois provides a high level
description of the kinds of things (and relationships among them) that play representation
roles when propositional information is communicated.
As described in Chapter 2, BRM (Figure 6.1) consists of three entity types —Propositional
content, Symbol Structure, Patterned Matter & Energy— and three relationship types —Is
Expressed By, Is Encoded By, Is Inscribed In.
Important of BRM is a clear distinction between kinds (explicitly modeled) and roles,
distinction that is essential for proper and consistent conceptual modeling.
Notions like Propositional Content, Symbol Structure, and Patterned Matter & Energy
reflect established ontological kinds extensively investigated in philosophical ontology, pro-
viding solid foundational basics for their appropriate description and and their adoption as
primitives in our discourse about digital preservation.
BRM, although recognising it, does not explicitly capture the contingent nature of these
relationships, nor the causality that allow these relationships to be established in the first
2This distinction can be effectively aligned, respectively, with the notions of analog representation and
digital representation described by Dretske in his book ‘Knowledge and the Flow of Information’ [Dretske,
1983] and reported by Devlin [Devlin, 1995]. In avoiding confusion on the use of the term ‘digital’ we adopt
here a different terminology: the term ‘concrete representation’ will be used instead of analog representation
and symbolic representation will be used instead of digital representation.
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Propositional Content
Symbol Structure
Patterned Matter and 
Energy
Is Expressed By
Is Encoded By
Is Inscribed In
Figure 6.1: Basic Representation Model diagram
place:
“[BRM] does not indicate how these objects came to enter into these relation-
ships, spell out what entities and events are involved in creating and sustaining
these relationships, or provide full details on how these events are situated in the
context of [digitally–mediated] communication.” [Wickett et al., 2012]
The Systematic Assertion Model (SAM), developed contextually with BRM, addresses
some of these critical aspects for a particular kind of digital resource: digital data. SAM com-
plements BRM by focusing on “key provenance events through which propositional content
and symbol structures acquire the status of ‘data content’ and ‘data’, respectively.” [Wickett
et al., 2012].
Appealing to concepts derived from Situation Theory [Devlin, 1995, Devlin, 2006], in
what follows we modify and extend BRM to capture the roles that agents play in scenarios
where communication happens, scenarios where the relationship types identified in BRM are
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instantiated and roles assigned.
6.2.2 The concrete representation level
Recall the examples of informing scenarios introduced in Chapter 4.
A Claudia engages a Chicago Transportation Authority (CTA) officer in a conversation to
obtain information about buses to downtown. When Claudia asks the officer, the officer
informs Claudia that the bus 147 to downtown leaves at 4:15PM (some information);
B Claudia picks at the bus station a CTA bus schedule printed brochure. By ‘reading’
the brochure, Claudia is informed that the bus 147 to downtown leaves at 4:15PM
(some information);
C Claudia ‘opens’ a digital version (e.g. a digital brochure in PDF format) of the CTA
bus schedule on her computer. By ‘reading’ the digital brochure on screen Claudia is
informed that the bus 147 to downtown leaves at 4:15PM (some information);
Each of these examples accounts for different prototypical cases of informing scenarios: in
example (A) Claudia is presented information in virtue of an intentional oral communication
act by another agent; in example (B) Claudia is presented with information by engaging with
an information–carrying physical artefact (a paper document); in example (C) Claudia is
presented with information in virtue of her interaction with a digital performance.
In each of these scenarios, there are well individuated parts of the world Claudia attends
to and interact with through her senses, and these parts of the world —a spoken utterance,
a written document, and a performance of a digital material, respectively— function for
Claudia as concrete representations of some information.
Situation Theory provides a primitive to characterize these (potentially complex) struc-
tured parts of the world: the notion of a situation.
The Situation Theory notion of a situation was first introduced by Barwise and Perry:
66
“The world consists not just of objects, or of objects, properties and relations,
but of objects having properties and standing in relations to one another. And
there are parts of the world, clearly recognized (although not precisely individ-
uated) in common sense and human language. These parts of the world are
called situations. Events and episodes are situations in time, scenes are visually
perceived situations, changes are sequences of situations, and facts are situations
enriched (or polluted) by language.” [Barwise and Perry, 1980]
While the notion of a situation has been refined in the Situation Theory literature in
various, though related, ways, for the purpose of this work, we adopt the following definition:
Definition 3 (Situation) A situation is a temporally and spatially located structured
part of reality perceived as a unit by a cognitive agent in virtue of a scheme of individu-
ation.
On this account, a scheme of individuation is the way an agent “carves up reality” into
cognitive “manageable pieces” from her “fuzzy perception of the world” [Devlin, 1995]. It is
the (innate or acquired) cognitive capability of an agent to discriminate entities in the world
as individuals —and particular situations are examples of such individuals.
Different classes of agent have different schemes of identification. Situation Theory is
mostly concerned with agents of class Men3 [Devlin, 1995] —i.e. the class of all human
agents— but Situation Theory can be applied effectively to other types of agents, for example
computing machines.4
3While agent of class human being can be understood as having a shared scheme of individuation, it is
plausible to believe that, at a finer level of granularity, each different agent has some personal scheme that
is not necessarily shared among the other agents in the same macro class.
4In [Devlin, 1995], Devlin illustrates an example of application on a simple robot.
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From an agent’s cognitive perspective, situations function as concrete representations from
which information emerges —they carry information for an agent. More generally, however,
situations are contexts we can attend to, talk about, and be immersed in —therefore affecting,
contextually, what information is communicated.
The notion of a situation will be adopted later in this chapter instead of the notion of
Patterned Matter and Energy. The reason behind this change is justified by the fact that
in many circumstances —including those where communication of information in mediated
by digital technology— what counts as a concrete representation cannot be reduced to a
specific material object. In the case of a particular spoken utterance or a particular digital
performance, for example, while certain patterned matter is involved in defining their identity
and unity, for their inherent temporal aspect they cannot be reduced to any particular
material object. The notion of a situation also captures the agent–and–context–dependent
role of being a concrete representation, a role that certain structured part of reality plays: a
situation (or at least its individuation as such) is functionally dependent on an agent “picking
up” that situation from her perception of the world. In fact, even when a situation only
involves a particular material object (as in the case of a paper document), the recognition
of the object as a document (a situation of a certain sort) is agent dependent.5
A situation carries a particular propositional content for an agent in virtue of the agent
recognition of certain abstract patterns from the situation, in such a way as to neglect
details that cannot serve to differentiate meaning. These abstract representation levels will
be discussed next.
5This account is not dissimilar to Suzanne Briet perspective of what counts as a document. As reported by
Michael Bukland, Briet notes that “An antelope running wild on the plains of Africa should not be considered
a document,[. . . ]. But if it were to be captured, taken to a zoo and made an object of study, it has been
made into a document. It has become physical evidence being used by those who study it”. [Buckland, 1997]
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6.2.3 The abstract representation levels
When they experience situations in the world, agents also recognize, through their scheme of
individuation, recurring patterns (called uniformities in Situation Theory). These patterns
allow agents to classify individuals within a situation (and situations themselves) with respect
to similarities or differences. Situation theory adopts the notion of type6 to characterize
classes of individuals that share common characteristics.
In virtue of these recurring patterns, abstract objects are recognised. An example of
this process is the capability of cognitive agents to recognise the individual particulars as
instances of a specific kind (for example, a particular dog being an instance of the kind dog).
This process is described as the process of abstraction in Situation Theory.
Situation types in this sense can be effectively aligned with the notion of abstract state
of affairs described in the previous chapter. Situation types abstract from particular con-
crete situations those characteristics that are functional to specific cognitive processes, one
of which is the recognition that certain abstract objects stand in contingent relationship
with situations. Examples of such objects are symbol structures, objects that function as
representations of information at the abstract level.
Examples in this sense is the recognition of a sentence (an abstract symbol structure)
from a spoken utterance (a situation), or a text (a symbol structure at a lower level than
sentences) from a paper document (a situation as well). The process of abstraction also
allows the recognition that a spoken utterance and a paper document can realize the same
sentence —albeit at different level of encoding in the representation stack.
While the pattern recognition is enabled by the agent scheme of individuation (and hap-
pens at the perception level of cognition), the process of abstraction involves an interpretation
of the sensory signal. This is actually a proper feature of cognitive agents: they are able to
6Type in this sense should not be confused with the metaphysical notion of natural kind nor with the
formal ontology notion of type. A type in this sense simply denotes a class of individuals (e.g. a class of
situations) sharing certain common characteristics.
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go from the concrete to the abstract symbolic level such that discrete unit of information
can emerge from the fuzzy perception of the world.
The outcome of this interpretation process is governed by specific constraints applied in
the process.
Constraints are “natural laws, conventions, analytic rules, linguistic rules, empirical lawlike
correspondences, or whatever” [Devlin, 1995] and, more generally, the background knowl-
edge that an agent applies in the process of going from the concrete to the abstract level
—ultimately leading to the propositional information level. Both the agent’s scheme of indi-
viduation and the set of constraints an agent applies in the cognitive process are components
of the agent’s interpretive frame [Dubin et al., 2011].
Constraints typically operate over classes of situations sharing certain characteristics —
i.e. at the level of situation types. And, in fact, constraints such as the English language
vocabulary and grammar can be multiply applied to a variety of situations where certain
patterns are recognized —being them patterns of sounds in spoken utterances or marks of
ink on paper.
The process of abstraction also supports the recognition that a symbolic representation
can be encoding other symbolic representations in a recursive set of contingent mappings.
Any specific mapping —and the encoding relationships— are again governed by specific
constraints. Linguistics and philosophy of language have extensively discussed and described
such levels for both oral and written communication, an example being the phoneme level
—that abstracts speech sounds in such a way as to neglect details that cannot serve to
differentiate meaning. Other analogous kinds of abstractions (sometimes called ‘emic units’)
include morphemes, graphemes, and lexemes [Pike, 1954].
What information emerges from a particular concrete situation is functional of the specific
constraints the agent is “attuned to or at least aware of” [Devlin, 1995] and are applied in
the interpretation process.
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6.3 The agent’s perspectives on information
communication
When a cognitive agent is exposed to a situation, certain information sometimes emerges.
What information emerges is a function of the interpretive frame —in terms of scheme of
individuation and constraints— that the agent applies in the cognitive process.
This perspective aligns with the OAIS approach, where the requirements to access an
Information Object are modeled according to a Data Object and its Representation Infor-
mation: “data interpreted via its representation information yields information”.7 [CCSDS,
2002]
Following these premises, we can formalize the general requirements for an agent to be
presented with a specific propositional content p —i.e. for an agent a to be successfully
informed that p— and the conditions for successful communication between agents —i.e.
the conditions for an agent a to successfully inform an agent b that p. Let’s consider being
informed first.
6.3.1 What it is to be informed
Given some propositional content p, an agent a is informed that p at time t1 if and only if:
8
(BI1) a individuates a situation s of type S at time t1
(BI2) situations of type S function as a concrete representation of p according to IF
(BI3) a intentionally applies IF when experiencing s
7This initial view is expanded in the OAIS Reference Model, where other categories of information
contribute to the meaning of data (for example context information and provenance information [CCSDS,
2002]).
8In ordinary circumstances, the interpretive frame is applied on the basis of certain assumptions and
intentions that make it appropriately useful. In theory, there might be random applications of arbitrary
interpretive frame that satisfy this definition; in fact, the exemplary cases are where an interpretive frame
is chosen deliberately in virtue of certain assumptions and with the intention of a certain result.
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From this account, several observations follow:
• not only an agent is required for information to emerge, but what information an agent
is presented with is a function of the interpretive frame she applies to the process;
• agents applying different interpretive frames when experiencing the same situation (or
situations of the same type) can be presented with very different information;
• an agent can be presented with the same information from different combinations of
situations and interpretive frames.
This perspective carries direct implications for contexts where a situation is meant to
function as a concrete representation for a particular propositional content. This is certainly
the case when an intentional informing act is in place (such as with oral communication)
but also in contexts where certain resources (such as those found in libraries, archives, and
museums) are curated with the intent for them to function as designated carriers of certain
information. Maintaining a resource available does not imply that the information a resource
is intended to carry remains available.
It also captures the fact that the same resource can carry different (or more) information for
different users. For example, an archivist versed in diplomatics (an example of background
knowledge that can be applied as part of an interpretive frame) is more likely to obtain more
information when exposed to an archival document than a person without that knowledge.
The diagram in Figure 6.2 modifies and extends BRM, summarizing the types of rela-
tionships that need to be instantiated at any point in time for an agent to be presented
with some intended information (modeled as propositional content). The diagram should
be considered a snapshot of the relevant binary relationships in play and it does nor reflect
dependencies and combinations.
The relationship types Experiences and Discriminates are cognitive–established relation-
ships between and agent and individuals in the world (both abstract and concrete) and are
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Symbol Structure
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Is expressed by
Is encoded by
Is realized by
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Figure 6.2: Entities and relationships
contingently dependent on the agent’s scheme of individuation.
The relationship types Is realized by, Is encoded by, and Is expressed by and Is carried
by represent, following BRM, the contingent mappings that are instantiated within the
representation stack of information —relationships that allow to ‘go’ from a concrete entity
an agent perceives through her sense perception up to the propositional content the agent is
presented with. These relationships are contingent upon the agent involved in an informing
situation and the constraints the agent applies in the cognitive process. They describe
the way agents “carve up reality into manageable pieces” [Devlin, 1995] such that certain
information emerges from the environment.
The relationship type Is presented with represents a general category of propositional
attitudes between an agent and certain propositional content.
The diagram also accounts for the recursive encoding relationship type between symbol
structures we identified in BRM. Such relationships capture the intuition that different
abstract levels of representation can be individuated in the interpretation process, each level
encoding another. This in not to say that each individually identified level might directly
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represent certain information. Again the fact that certain propositional content is expressed
by a symbol structure is dependant on the agent interpretive frame, therefore we need to
acknowledge that for different agents (attuned to different interpretive frames) different
information might emerge at any level.
The Is carried by relationship type is based on a function composition of the specific
constraints mapping the individual representation levels and accounts for the relationship
holding between a situation and certain information according to the entirety of a specific
applied interpretive frame.
The distinction presented here reflects the contingent and intentional nature of these
relationships:
• a scheme of individuation establishes contingent cognitive relationships between indi-
vidual entities and the agent itself;
• constraints an agent is attuned are appealed to define how those individuals (both
concrete and abstract) relate among each other in the informing process.
Let’s consider now what it is to inform and the intentional participation of a communi-
cating agent in the process.
6.3.2 What it is to intend to inform
The information an agent might be presented with does not necessarily arise from the ex-
perience of natural phenomena in the environment. In many situations of our everyday live
there is an intentional communication process in place, one initiated by another agent who
intends to communicate or to inform.
Here we explore what it means for an agent a to successfully inform an agent b that p,
where p denotes some propositional content.
74
In identifying the conditions for ‘a informs b that p’ to be successful, we appeal to the
Gricean theory of meaning [Grice, 1957], and the Situation–Theory–based paradigm pre-
sented above.
The Gricean analysis of speaker meaning runs as follows:
(G1) a utters x intending an agent b to form the belief that p
(G2) a intends that b recognises (G1)
(G3) a intends that b forms the belief that p at least partly because b recognises (G1)
We modify here the Gricean analysis to derive an account of actual informing intent.
In actuality, that ‘an agent a intends to inform a potential agent b that p’ is equal by
definition to:
(II1) a utters x intending an agent b to be presented with p
(II2) a intends that b recognises (II1)
(II3) a intends that b is presented with p at least partly because b recognises (II1)
The changes introduced above are intended to ‘loosen’ some of Gricean requirements, in
particular the requirements for the agent b to form a belief: the ‘is presented with’ expression
represents a very general relationship between b and p avoiding unnecessary propositional
attitude implications. They are also meant to emphasize an actual communication act,
expression of an informing intent, regardless, for now, of a successful informing process, one
requiring a receiving agent being informed.
Let’s discuss each of these conditions in more detail.
Condition (II1): ‘a utters x intending an agent b to be presented with p’
Condition (II1) describes the intentional act of an agent a to communicate some propositional
content p.
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In order for p to be communicated, the agent amust select (in the mind) a symbol structure
x to function as a symbolic representation of p. A typical example in this sense is the use
of a sentence in a language (e.g. the English sentence ‘the snow is white’) to express some
propositional content (e.g. that the snow is white). Examples of concrete representations
in this sense are spoken utterances but also, as we will see in the next chapter, persistent
artefacts such as a written document.
The uttering event is understood as producing (or at least indicating) a situation s of type
S intended to function as a concrete representation for p by realizing the selected symbol
structure x. If a symbol structure x expresses some propositional content p for an agent a,
and a situation s is the utterance of x, then we say that p is carried by s (for the agent a).
When an agent establishes these relationships, the agent appeals to an interpretive frame
(or several interpretive frames) that govern the relational mapping between the entities
involved. The established relationships are therefore intentional with respect to the uttering
agent and contingent with respect to the applied interpretive frame.
On this account, situations of type S are those situations that make actual a state of
affairs in the form
//∃(y)[realizes(y, r, CIF
1
) & expresses(r, p, CIF
2
)]// (6.1)
where the variable y ranges over concrete entities, r is a particular symbol structure, and
CIF
1
is a constraint part of IF mapping a situation to a symbol structure x and CIF
2
is a
constraint mapping the symbol structure x to the propositional content p. This state of
affairs may obtain, or not, and it obtains only if the conjunction above is true.
Considering again the example of the English sentence ‘the snow is white’, what pragmat-
ically happens is that the agent applies the constraints of the English language to establish
relationships between an utterance situation and the sentence ‘the snow is white’, and be-
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tween the sentence and the proposition that the snow is white (some propositional content).9
The diagram in Figure 6.3 summarizes the relationships between entities from an uttering
agent perspective:
Propositional 
Content
Uttering agent Situation
Symbol Structure
Communicates
Selects / Utters
Produces/Indicates
Expresses
Encodes
Embodies
is Carried by
Figure 6.3: Entities and relationships
Similarly to the perspective on being informed, the relationship types Is realized by, Is
encoded by, Is expressed by and Is carried express the contingent mappings that are instan-
tiated in the representation stack of information according to specific constraints part of an
interpretive frame.
Different from the perspective on being informed, the relationship types Produces / In-
dicates, Selects / Utters, and Communicates connecting the agent with the entity types
describe the intentional process of ‘building’ the representation stack according to a partic-
ular interpretive frame.
9A similar perspective can be applied when multiple levels of abstract encoding working at different ‘emic’
levels are involved.
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Condition (II2): a intends that b recognises (II1)
Conditions (II2) simply describes the intent of a communicating agent to let a potential
receiving agent b recognizing her original communication intent. We interpret this condition
here as a’s intent to support (or at least not intentionally impede) b’s recognition of the
conditions under which a certain situation s is intended to carry p —i.e. the recognition by
b of the interpretive frame actually applied by a in (II1).
Condition (II3): ‘a intends that b is presented with p at least partly because b
recognises (II1)’
Condition (II3) describes the causal conditions required for an uttering act to be an informing
act. The agent a intends that a potential agent b is presented with p not by accident, but
because of a causal connection between a’s intent and b’s relationship with p.
If b recognises a intention —i.e. b recognises (II1)— b becomes at least aware of the
appropriate interpretive frame to apply when experiencing s —i.e. an interpretive frame
sufficiently similar to one a applied in (II1). In this case, b is in a position to recognize
that s carry p by vertically transversing the actual representation stack from the concrete
representation level to the abstract levels of encoding, up to the propositional level.
From b’s perspective, this process is perfectly aligned with the account of being informed
presented above: an agent b is informed that p at time t1 if and only if:
(BI1) b individuates a situation s of type S at time t1
(BI2) situations of type S function as a concrete representation of p according to IF
(BI3) b intentionally applies IF when experiencing s
The additional criterium here is the recognition of an agent’s informing intent that es-
tablishes what interpretive frame —in terms of scheme of individuation and appropriate
constraints— should be applied.
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We should finally note that the process of obtaining information from a situation is highly
contextual and the interpretive frame actually applied in the process might be affected by a
multiplicity of factors including, but not limited to, the context where the communication
happens, other previous knowledge brought into bear on the interpretation process itself,
etc.
This perspective is recognised by OAIS with its notion of context information [CCSDS,
2002], an essential component of any representation information. It is also recognised in
Situation Theory and Situation Semantics where the notions of discourse situation —the
situation where an utterance happens— and the notion of resource situation —a pre-existing
situation mentioned, or referred to, in the utterance— are utilized as other parameters
affecting what information is successfully communicated.
While these variances are recognised here, by interpretive frame we intend, when not
otherwise noted, the minimal scheme of individuation and set of constraints required for
certain information to emerge from a situation of a certain type.
6.3.3 What it is to successfully inform
From the perspectives on being informed and (actually) intending to inform, we can derive
the conditions for a successful informing process.
For an agent a to successfully inform and agent b that p, the analysis runs as follows:
(SI1) a produces (or indicates) a situation s of type S by applying IF intending b to be
presented with p
(SI2) a intends that b recognises (SI1)
(SI3) b is presented with p at least partly because b recognises that (SI1) and therefore
applies IF when experiencing s
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6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented an analysis of information, describing the role that represen-
tation levels and agents play, and emphasising the intentional and contingent nature of
information communication.
While information should always be distinguished from any abstract and concrete repre-
sentation of that information, we must recognise that, in order to access and interact any
information, an agent (such a user, but also a processing agent at the machine level) needs
to engage with a concrete representation of that information.
An interpretation process is always required in order for an agent to be presented with cer-
tain information, a process that involves specific means —described in terms of interpretive
frames— for the interpretation to happen as intended.
In the next chapter this perspective is applied to further analyze the issues of information
preservation, concluding that many of the issues we face in the stewardship of our digital
cultural heritages can be described from a communication point of view.
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CHAPTER 7
INFORMATION PRESERVATION AS SUSTAINED
RELIABLE COMMUNICATION
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we showed how definitions of preservation have evolved to address the changing
nature of information–carrying objects, culminating in definitions of digital preservation
where the emphasis was on maintaining access and not preserving objects.
In Chapter 4 we took a closer look at the common notions of preserving the bits and
preserving information, noting how preservation in its literal sense does not apply, nor is
required in the scenarios being described, and suggesting alternative accounts.
In Chapter 5 we explored three influential approaches to digital preservation that more
accurately describe the complex nature of digital material. Despite the many insights, none
of these approaches deliver complete and ontologically precise accounts. We also noted
how the notion of preserving access to digital materials can be more precisely understood
from a communication perspective: preserving access to digital materials is about sustaining
interpretation and communication processes.
In Chapter 6 we elaborated on those topics by developing a set of interrelated concepts
useful to understand how information is represented and communicated. The emerging
conceptual framework builds on previous work by the Data Conservancy Data Concepts
(DCDC) group at Illinois and is informed by Keith Devlin’s Situation Theory ontology.
In this chapter, we utilize the framework as a lens to better understand the key issues and
opportunities in digital stewardship.
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Particular emphasis is given to the communication of information sustained by information–
carrying artefacts and the roles of agents involved —especially in scenarios where changes
in the underlying communication technology modify the requirements for particular infor-
mation to emerge.
Core problems of identity and change in a digital context are addressed here, as are related
problems of authenticity and integrity.
We concluded that successful digital preservation is best understood as
successfully sustained reliable communication through time and across changes in
the mediating digital technology.
7.2 Information–carrying artefacts: opportunities and
challenges
As presented in the previous chapter, information communication is a highly interactive pro-
cess where the parties engaged need to share some form of representation of that information
and a sufficiently common interpretive frame.
Besides direct communication —such as face-to-face communication— communication of-
ten happens with the support of artefacts of some sort entrusted to function as information
carriers. Examples from Chapter 4 describe variations on this kind of scenarios: Claudia is
presented with information by engaging with a printed brochure (example B) and a digital
brochure (example C) both functioning as carriers of some information.
Artefacts of this sort are commonly utilized to sustain the communication process across
time and contexts, where no direct interaction between the artefact’s producer and users is
implied.
When an artefact is produced, or merely indicated, with the purpose of carrying some
information, the intentional act assigns the artefact an information carrying role. This
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process can be considered an uttering act similar in many respects to the production of a
spoken utterance: the producer applies an interpretive frame such that the artefact counts
as a situation (of a certain type) intended to carry information.
Substantially different, however, is the output of the process: the produced representation
(and thus the informing situation) is not ephemeral, as a spoken utterance is: artefacts
of this sort typically manifest some form of persistence. At future times then, agents can
be presented with the information the artifact was intended to carry (at the time of its
production or indication) if attuned, or at least aware of, an appropriate interpretive frame.
This form of communication is inherently open–ended, resembling a broadcast: if an
artefact is produced by an agent a at time t1 with the intention to inform that p, the
informing process only resolves when an agent b (at a time t2, future to t1) engages with the
artefact and is presented with p.
When information–carrying artefacts are involved in a communication process, new op-
portunities emerge: the very fact that material traces of information can be utilized to carry
information into the future is at the very core of many forms of ‘information preservation’:
“Humans have a long tradition of retaining information artefacts for future use.
Collecting institutions —libraries, archives and museums— manage extensive
collections of materials that can communicate events, insights, facts and per-
spectives to those who encounter them.” [Lee, 2012]
However, new challenges are introduced as well. Consider again the Gricean–based account
of successful information presented in the previous chapter, and in particular conditions SI2
and IS3.
(SI1) a produces (or indicates) a situation s of type S by applying IF intending b to be
presented with p
(SI2) a intends that b recognizes that (SI1)
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(SI3) b is presented with p at least partly because b recognizes that (SI1) and therefore
applies IF when experiencing s
Conditions (SI2) and (SI3) require the recognition of (SI1). However, we cannot assume
that an artefact in itself can support such a recognition.
Information artefacts can be produced according to interpretive frames that are common
enough to be considered part of a shared background knowledge of the community where
the artefact will be utilized. Intuitive examples are written documents, such as newspaper
articles or books, where an adopted language1 (e.g. the English language) is a shared enough
interpretive frame such that the author’s communication intent is recognized.2
Many times, however, such a recognition cannot be taken for granted. Christopher Lee
summarized this perspective when discussing the role of institutions with respect to the
‘curation of information’:
“The curation of information artifacts is fundamentally different from direct com-
munication in that one cannot assume that the parties who generated the traces
will be available to provide ‘answers to further questions.’ Instead, one must make
educated guesses about likely uses of the traces and then pre–emptively respond
to likely questions by embedding appropriate information in the mechanisms
used to manage and provide access to the traces (e.g. repositories, collection
descriptions, information packages).” [Lee, 2012]
Lee captures the central role that stewardship institutions need to play in sustaining the
flow of information from the creator of an information–carrying artefact to its potential
1And other components of an interpretive frame such character mappings and layout conventions, among
others.
2Even where a shared language is adopted, contextual information [CCSDS, 2002] might be required
for the intended information to emerge. Consider for example a technical manual lacking a glossary of the
adopted technical terms. While a reader might assume a commons sense meaning for those terms, technical
terms are often laden with implicit and context-sensitive semantics that cannot be directly inferred from the
document itself.
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future users: beside ‘preserving’ an artefact,3 they need to support and facilitate condition
(SI2) such that (SI3) can successfully obtain without a direct interaction between the parties
involved in the artefact–supported and open–ended informing process.
This perspective certainly applies to artefacts intended to sustain directly a human–level
communication when they are experienced. Examples of these persistent artefacts are writ-
ten documents, such as manuscripts, printed books, newspaper articles, etc. These sorts of
persistent material artefacts are produced according to constraints that map level of repre-
sentations human beings can typically discriminate and recognize.
A similar analysis can be applied to information communicated with the support of digital
technology, albeit accounting for additional levels of complexity and the active mediation
role that machine agents play in the process.
Let’s explore both these scenarios in more details.
7.3 Communication sustained by persistent material
artefacts
Consider the case of an original manuscript document, and how such a material artefact can
sustain information communication.
When the document’s author, we call her agent a, inscribes specific ink marks on paper
with the intent of communicating some information p (an uttering act), she brings into being
an utterance situation s of type S involving the produced artefact.
An interpretive frame, we call it IF , is required and applied in the process. IF includes a’s
scheme of individuation and multiple constraints mapping the different levels of encoding
in the representation stack. On this account, S is the type of situation sharing certain
characteristics such that situations of type S (e.g. s) are capable of carrying p according to
3Preservation here is intended in a broader sense as in the general definitions of preservation presented
in Chapter 3.
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IF .
When an agent b attuned to IF experiences s, s is recognized as being of type S and, if
the appropriate constraints that are part of IF are applied in an interpretation process, b is
presented with p.
So far we assumed that b is informed that p by engaging with exactly the same s the
uttering agent a produced.
Because interpretive frames operate at the situation type level, however, we shall note
that any situation x can be utilized in the process as long as x is of type S.
Different material objects can in fact exhibit the minimal set of characteristics such that p
can emerge when sufficiently similar IFs are applied —examples being copies of an original
manuscript produced by medieval monastic scribes, but also different copies of the same
edition of a printed book. We adopt the following notation from Situation Theory to denote
a situation x of type S:
x : S (7.1)
Which characteristics are essential for any x to provide access to p in virtue of an ap-
propriate interpretive frame IF is, in fact, dependent on the IF under consideration. The
total constraint component of any IF mapping p to a situation s can be understood as a
function composition of the individual constrains mapping the relevant level of abstraction
in the representation stack.
When individually considered, as in the example presented in Figure 7.1, different types
can be individuated selecting relevant parts of a representation stack starting from the
propositional level, and according to the appropriate constraints mapping the levels.
Each type S1, S2, and S3, respectively, imposes additional characteristics on a situation
in order for that situation to be considered of that type: S1 only requires that there be a
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Figure 7.1: Types according to levels of representations and constraints
particular sentence–level representation (leaving open how that sentence is further encoded
at lower symbol structure level, down to the concrete representation level); S2 further imposes
a certain grapheme–level representation (but not how graphemes are encoded in terms of
glyphs); and so on.
Representations at the concrete level can in fact be substantially different still being con-
sidered of the same relevant type.
This analysis is here applied to explain:
1. preservation scenarios, such as those described in the transitional definitions of preser-
vation presented in Chapter 3, where media migration and reformatting is applied;
2. more generally, how information can intentionally flow across a communication lifecycle
where that information is represented differently at different times.
We shall note, before moving forward, that transformative preservation practices —those
that somehow change the representation stack for certain information— are always expres-
sion of a preservation intent where established procedures are in place to ensure a certain
outcome — i.e. information is ‘carried over’ to new concrete representation not by chance.
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Given the inherent dependency of the success of those practices on specific interpretive
frames, the role of agents in the process is obviously essential.
7.3.1 Preserving information: media migration and reformatting
Consider, for example, the practice of media conversion or reformatting where materials are
preserved “in a condition suitable for use,[. . . ] in a form more durable” [Reitz, 2004b] or
“in a condition suitable for use [. . . ] in a more persistent format, while leaving intact the
objects intellectual form.” A microfilm produced from a printed book, for example, under
most circumstances is considered capable to carry the same relevant information content
of the original book, while being substantially different from the printed book in the set
of characteristics it exhibits. Media reformatting can be understood as altering part the
representation stack of certain information, leaving intact relevant abstract levels and the
relationships between them according the specific constraints.
Interestingly, successful media reformatting does not entail that an agent responsible for
the operation is presented, in the process, with the carried information: these changes
in the representation stack are typically applied at a ‘lower’ level of the stack where only
symbol structures are involved. Different from the process of translating certain propositional
content from, for example, one natural language to another, this is more a mechanical
mapping that does not necessary involve high level cognitive processes —such as those
required to operate at the propositional level where a change is introduced in the mapping
between a particular propositional content and an expressing symbol structure.
7.3.2 Preserving information through a communication lifecycle
The observations presented above also allow us to consider how certain information can flow
through a communication lifecycle, where a sequence of communication contexts —involving
different agents, activities, and means to represent information— are interconnected such
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that information systematically flows from one context to another.
Let’s consider a lifecycle example: the production of a printed book from a publishing
process perspective. A specific copy of a printed book (a copy you can find in your library)
is the final outcome of a complex production process where the content from an author’s
original manuscripts flows across different contexts.
Let p be the propositional content the author intends to communicate —the one carried
by the original manuscript. Consider now a sequence of concrete representations —the ones
involved in the production process— and their respective types:
{s1 : S1, s2 : S2, s3 : S3, . . . , sn : Sn} (7.2)
Consider also the sequence of appropriate interpretive frames to let p emerge from those
representations, according to their types:
{IFS1, IFS2 , IFS3, . . . , IFSn} (7.3)
Finally, consider a sequence of agents, each of them involved at a different step in the
production process:
{a1, a2, a3, . . . , an} (7.4)
The production process can be described as a sequence of contexts where agents mediate
the flow of information between each other with the support of persistent representations of
certain types. Figure 7.2 shows a simplified representation of ideal steps in the process, where
different agents are involved in mediating the flow of certain information across different
contexts where information is represented differently. In this simplified perspective, each
agent engages with two different representations (possibly of different types), the first one
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Figure 7.2: The flow of information p across different informing contexts
‘carrying over’ information p from a previous step —from which the agent is presented with
p— the second one produced by the agent to ‘carry over’ p to the next step in the production
process.
In order to sustain the flow of p from one context to another, agents involved at any step
in the process need to be attuned to at least two interpretive frames. Consider for example
the agent a2 involved in step 2. The agent a2 needs to be attuned, and to apply to the
process, two different interpretive frames:
1. IF1 to obtain p from x : S1
2. IF2 to produce y : S2 such that y : S2 carries p
Agents play a fundamental role in the process of sustaining the flow of information across
different contexts where information is represented differently: p can successfully flow across
contexts with different representation stacks involved only in virtue of agents capable of
‘bridging’ those contexts by being attuned to distinct appropriate interpretive frames.
The flows itself relies on the mutual recognition between agents of the interpretive frames
that need to be applied in the process following the Gricean–based account of successfully
informing, where conditions (SI2) and (SI3) need to be satisfied.
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We shall finally note that, similarly to the media reformatting, the flow of information
across multiple representations can sometimes be sustained through mechanical mapping
between lower levels of symbol structures, where the semantic propositional level is not
involved. This depends on the types of situations involved in the process.
7.4 Communication sustained by digital artefacts
When information is communicated with the support of digital technology, information is
carried, at the user level, by what we called digital performances. As noted in Chapter 5,
performances are concrete, yet ephemeral, entities and their production and existence are
dependent on appropriate processes happening within a digital environment. Performances
often involve temporal, dynamic, and interactive aspects, making them cognitively complex
concrete objects that only the notion of a situation seems to capture appropriately.
Performances in this sense are not persistent : they are produced when an appropriate
process happens at run time and cease to exist when the process stops. In this sense, when
appropriately produced, each performance of a digital material is a different performance
[Heslop et al., 2002] (of the same digital resource).
Despite their lack of persistence, performances function as concrete representations for
certain information intended to be communicated to the users engaging with them.
From a preservation perspective, we cannot materially preserve a performance the same
way we would preserve a material artefact: its parts are inherently temporal and transient.
This quote from InterPARES is helpful again in describing the problem:
“Empirically, it is not possible to preserve an electronic record: it is only possible
to preserve the ability to reproduce the record. That is because it is not possible
to store an electronic record in the documentary form in which it is capable
of serving as a record. There is inevitably a substantial difference between the
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digital representation of the record in storage and the form in which it is presented
for use. It is always necessary to use some software to translate the stored digital
bits into the documentary form of the record.” [InterPARES, 2001]
Described here is one of the peculiar characteristics of the communication mediated by
digital technology: what counts as a concrete representation at the user level is, in fact,
not a persistent artifact: it is not something that can be “stored” beyond any individual
run-time session where a performance is produced.
While we are making advances by recognizing the distorting effects of metaphors and
idioms, we need to be careful not to place too much weight on new distorting metaphors —
however much insight they may provide in context, they still do not provide a reliable mode.
Just as no entity is preserved, no ability is literally preserved either, and ‘reproducing a
record’ is not, literally, producing a record, let alone reproducing one, but rather producing
a performance that exemplifies the documentary form [Duranti, 2005] of a record. This
process happens within a digital environment and involves a machine agent being presented
with information other than the one a user is intended to be presented with.
This information —typically involving some form of machine level instructions— is carried
by what InterPARES calls “digital representation of the record in storage” [InterPARES,
2001]. More precisely, this information is carried by a persistent representation —typically
some form of storage memory— and expressed (directly or indirectly) by sequences of bits
realized by the storage memory.
An interpretation process needs to happen according to a specific machine–level interpre-
tive frame that allows a machine agent to map a storage situation (the concrete represen-
tation level) to the bits and other higher–level data structures (the abstract representation
levels) and ultimately to the instructions (the information level). The machine agent acts
upon this information to produce a performance.
This interpretive frame is typically expressed as technical specifications at various levels
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including, but not limited to, filesystem specification and file format specification, each of
them, respectively, constraining the mapping between a storage situation and a particular
set of bits, and the mapping from the bits to the instruction information. The machine
agent can become attuned to such an interpretive frame in virtue of appropriate software
components within the digital environment that becomes available at run–time.
Even in this case, and in alignment with the perspective on communication presented in
the previous chapter, constraints operate at the level of situation types. Consider a type
STbs identified by the following state of affairs:
//realizes(x, bs, CIFm
1
)// (7.5)
where bs is a particular bit sequence, x is a variable ranging over storage situations, CIFm
1
is a constraint (part of a broader interpretive frame IFm available at the machine level) in
virtue of which bs is realized by a storage situation x.
Every storage situation x that satisfies the formula ‘realizes(x, bs, CIFm
1
)’ is a storage
situation of type STbs; these are the storage situations that minimally exemplify a set of
characteristics such that bs can be discriminated by a machine agent attuned to CIF
1
. Again,
to form the name of the state of affairs corresponding to the open formula we bracket the
formula with double solidi.
We shall stress here that different concrete storage situations of type STbs can realize bs
for a machine agent attuned to IFm (or at least attuned to the constraint C
IFm
1 part of
IFm). This supports the intuition discussed in Chapter 4 that the same bit sequence, being
an abstraction, can be multiply and repeatedly realized by different storage devices.
When the appropriate IFm is applied in all its components, pm emerges for the machine
agent from a storage situation of type STbs. By acting upon pm the machine agent produces a
signal that changes the physical arrangement of an output devise, producing a performance,
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we call it dp1, that would make actual an intended digital material dm.
If we call DPdm the type of those performances that would make actual dm, we can say
that the interpretive frame IFm links the storage situation type STbs to a particular digital
performance type DPdm.
ds : DS
dp
1 
: DP
dm
dp
2 
: DP
dm
st : ST
bs
IFu IFu
IFm IFm
User level
communication
Machine level
communication
Creation 
context
Use
context
UserCreator
Digital environment Digital environment
Figure 7.3: Situations at the user and machine communication levels
What a particular IF consists of is a matter of decisions taken at the time of ‘creation’
of a particular digital material4 where an agent selects:
1. how to represent certain information via performances of a certain digital material
—i.e. situations that makes actual an intended state of affairs— by selecting and
applying an interpretive frame;
2. how the information to produce appropriate performance of the intended digital ma-
terial is encoded and stored at the machine level (i.e. which sequence of bits needs
to be realized by a persistent storage situation) and what machine–level interpretive
frame (i.e. what file format specification) shall be applied at future times to a storage
situation of that type to obtain the intended machine–level information.
4Or subsequent changes in the representation stack that might have happened later in the communication
lifecycle of certain information.
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From this perspective we can say that, given an intended digital material dm, DPdm is
the type of those performances that make dm actual.
The relationship between a specific bit level representation and a digital material can
then be expressed as a relationship between types of situations governed by an appropriate
interpretive frame, where situations of a certain type —e.g. storage situations of type STbs—
carry information about situations of another type —e.g. performances of typeDPdm—when
an appropriate machine–level interpretive frame —e.g. IFm— is applied.
Similarly, we can say that performances of a certain type DPdm carry information about
a described situation DS when an appropriate user–level interpretive frame is applied.
The diagram in Figure 7.3 summarizes this perspective presenting both the creation and
the use context.
This analytical approach can be applied to model prototypical challenges in digital stew-
ardship.
7.4.1 Bits preservation
As described in Chapter 4, preserving the bits can be understood as preserving a certain
analog arrangement of physical material5 from which a computer can derive a signal of some
sort that by relevant conventions is given a digital interpretation.
On this account, preserving the bits involves an active process where a machine agent
within a digital environment discriminates a symbol structure (i.e. the bits) from a storage
situation in virtue of the application of an appropriate interpretive frame.
In the long term, however, hardware components at the machine level are prone to change.
Therefore, from a long term stewardship perspective, we should account for a change in the
storage situations intended to realize the bits: bits need to be ‘copied’ from one storage
5No assumptions here are made on whether the physical material arranged in such a way is the exact
same material at different times. The emphasis here is on the required availability of such an arrangement
in order to access the bits.
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device to another in a physical medium migration process.
Physical media migration — i.e. ‘copying the bits’
The relationships between representation levels in the representation stack of certain infor-
mation are contingent and dependent on specific interpretive frames that an agent applies
when experiencing a concrete representation in the form of a situation.
As also noted, information can be intentionally ‘carried over’ across different concrete rep-
resentations —involving different abstract representation levels as well— in virtue of agents
attuned to appropriate interpretive frames. When an agent is presented with certain infor-
mation from one concrete representation (in virtue of the application of certain interpretive
frames), the agent can apply a different interpretive frame to produce or indicate a different
concrete representations intended to carry the same information.
This perspective is intuitively applied in our everyday life, when, for example, we ‘copy’
a text from a physical book to our notepad with the intent for the ‘copied text’ to express
the same information carried by the text realized by the physical book.
This perspective, however, can also explain the process of ‘copying the bits’ from one
physical medium —e.g. a storage device– to another. This process can only happen within
a digital environment where a machine agent can discriminate the intended bit sequence from
a storage situation according to an appropriate interpretive frame, and arranges a different
storage situation in such a way that, according to a (potentially different) interpretive frame,
the same bit sequence can be discriminated.
Even at this low ‘physical’ level, we shall stress the machine agent’s interpretation role
in the process: bits can be ‘copied’ from one storage device to another only in virtue of a
machine agent that is attuned to and applies potentially different, yet appropriate, interpre-
tive frames. The process itself is part of on active communication process happening at the
machine level, one that the machine agent sustains and mediates.
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7.4.2 Digital materials preservation
Bit preservation is only the first required step for successful digital stewardship. Interpreting
the bits such that an intended digital material obtains through appropriate performances is
essential as well.
Also, as digital technology changes, or to accommodate specific preservation intents, dig-
ital materials might need to be migrated to new file formats.
The process of preserving digital materials is in fact a mediation process intended to
sustain certain communication at the machine level in a predictable and reliable way and
across time and changes in digital technology.
Let’s consider the case where no change is expected nor pursued at the bit representation
level, and then the case where digital materials are migrated to different file formats.
Producing appropriate performances over time from the bits
As we saw above, the process of producing a performance that appropriately makes an
intended digital material actual can be effectively understood as a communication process
where a machine agent is presented with certain instruction information by interpreting the
bits according to appropriate constraints. These constraints, typically expressed in terms of
file format specification, can only be applied when software components of an appropriate
class are recognised by the machine agent (another discrimination process) and utilized in
the interpretation process. The outcome of such a process is typically a signal intended to
physically rearrange an output device (e.g. a screen, a set of speakers, etc.).
Despite the application of the same interpretive frame to the same bit level representation,
performances produced over time can be significantly different, depending on the specific
digital environment involved. Nevertheless, when certain minimal characteristics in the
digital environment are met, performances produced in this way should be appropriate with
respect to an intended digital material: they should minimally share (i.e. they all should
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exemplify) the characteristics that the intended digital material encodes.
From a digital stewardship perspective it is therefore essential to capture and record
(for example using appropriate technical metadata) the minimal requirements to produce
appropriate digital performances given a bit level representation, both in terms of interpretive
frames, but also in terms of a set of hardware and software components that are appropriate
for the application of that interpretive frame.
Requirements in this sense should sustain the flow of instruction information that needs
to happen at the machine level, and in such a way that the communication process can
be multiply repeated over time, and accounting for variations in the digital environment
involved in the process.
Format migration as mediated communication
Under certain circumstances, however, a specific digital material needs to be migrated from
a file format to another. Examples of these circumstances include, but are not limited to:
1. the original file format is not optimal to support the production of appropriate perfor-
mances in the long term (e.g. the original file format is a proprietary format associated
only with a specific software application not maintained anymore);
2. the effective access to a specific digital material from members of a designated commu-
nity —or the access to the information the material is intended to carry— depends on
a hardware/software environment other than the one the original file format supports
(e.g. users of a community are expected to be served digital images on the web, but the
original file format of the images is not supported by modern browsers; or, scientific
data encoded in a specific file format can be more effectively analyzed when the same
data in encoded in a different format).
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From a high–level perspective, the process of migrating a digital material from one file
format to another is a communication process where a machine agent modifies certain map-
pings in the machine–level representation stack of certain information, such that information
can flow across contexts where it is represented differently.
This process can be modeled, again, in terms of a N:1 relationship between different
storage situation types (defined in terms of different bit–level representations) and the same
intended performance type (defined in terms of essential characteristics that performances
need to exemplify in order to make actual an intended digital material).
Given a type of storage situation STbs1 —the type of those storage situations that realize
the bit sequence bs1— and the type of digital performance DPdm —the type of those digital
performances that make actual a digital material dm— we said that a link between these
type is established according to interpretive frames of a particular type IFm1 —those inter-
pretive frames that would let the appropriate instructions emerge from the bits such that a
performance of type DPdm is produced.
Appropriate software applications not only support the interpretation process to produce
a performance of type DPdm when an interpretive frame of type IF
m
1
is applied to a storage
situation of type STbs1 . They also support the process of encoding differently the instruction
information necessary to produce performances of the same type DPdm —therefore producing
a storage situation of a different type STbs2 that realizes a bit sequence bs2 that is linked to
DPdm according to interpretive frames of a different type IF
m
2
.
An example of such format migration process is the migration of a textual document
from the Microsoft Office Open XML format to the Portable Document Format (PDF)
format, where many experiential characteristics are retained (if not the same interactive
functionalities).
This process is not dissimilar in its logical components to the one presented above on
the production of a book —where we described how human agents can sustain the flow of
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information across different contexts where information is represented differently: the file
format migration process can only happen when a (machine) agent is involved and it medi-
ates, according to established procedures, the required communication process. Similarly as
well, the agent needs to be attuned to, and apply, two different interpretive frames:
• an interpretive frame of type IFm
1
to obtain the instruction information from a storage
situation of type STbs1 ;
• an interpretive frame of type IFm2 to produce a storage situation of type STbs2 .
Again, it is important to stress that what set of characteristics a particular digital material
dm encodes —and therefore appropriate performances of type DPdm need to minimally
exemplify— should be understood contextually, with respect to:
1. preservation expectations of the members of a community against which successful
preservation is assessed —that might inform and affect stewardship decisions;
2. the preservation intent of a stewardship organization;
3. the social and technical constraints the organization operates within —in terms of
policies, resources, and capabilities .
In fact, when considering performances produced by the interpretation of a storage situ-
ation of type STbs1 according to an interpretive frame of type IF
m
1
, the type DPdm —and
therefore the characteristics that performances of that type need to minimally exemplify—
can be defined differently in different contexts according to the criteria presented above.
On this account, frameworks such the one developed within the InSPECT project [Knight,
2009] to identify characteristics that are significant [Hedstrom and Lee, 2002,Dappert and
Farquhar, 2009, Lynch, 2013, Sacchi and McDonough, 2012,Wickett et al., 2012] to assess
successful preservation can play a major role in the process.
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From an information preservation perspective, the conceptual framework developed here
can be utilized as an analytical tool to individuate specific levels in the representation stack
of certain information that need to be retained across format migrations such that informa-
tion preservation can be considered successful with respect to preservation expectations of
different communities and different stewardship intents.
The process involves analyzing the required human–level interpretive frame necessary to
let the intended information to emerge from performances of a certain type, and decomposing
the interpretive frame in terms of the particular constraints mapping the individual levels
of abstraction —a process in many respects similar to the one described above for material
artefacts.
We shall also note that, when transformative preservation actions —such as format migration—
are applied, provenance information shall be captured as well utilizing appropriate metadata
standards.
Also, to fully support an appropriate interpretation of performances at the user level —
i.e. the application of an appropriate interpretive frame— additional contextual information
[CCSDS, 2002,Lee, 2011,Lee, 2012,McDonough, 2011,McDonough, 2012] might be required,
and shall be captured as well.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we applied the conceptual framework of information representation and
communication developed in Chapter 6 to analyze problems in information preservation.
We started with information carried by material artefact intended to function directly as
information–carriers, and we showed how many prototypical challenges and opportunities in
digital stewardship can be made vivid and explained through the same analytical lens.
Successful digital preservation of information can, in this sense, be conceived as sustained
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and reliable communication mediated by digital technology and agents involved in the com-
munication process, where ‘successful’ is always contextually defined with respect to certain
user–level expectations and stewardship intents.
The perspective presented here consolidates, within a consistent and precise conceptual
framework, many of the insights from previous conceptual modeling approaches to digital
preservation developed within the digital stewardship community [Thibodeau, 2002,CCSDS,
2002,Heslop et al., 2002,Duranti, 2005,Knight, 2009].
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The notion of preserving digital information is fundamental in the broad digital and data
stewardship agendas [Task Force on Archiving of Digital Information et al., 1996, Duerr
et al., 2004].
In this research we showed how the notion of preservation itself, derived from the tra-
ditional library, archive, and museum practice of “minimizing deterioration or damage” of
physical artefacts, is a metaphor that can mislead us to ‘what is really going on’ when the
goal is to provide access to the same information over time.
We also showed how influential conceptual approaches developed within the digital stew-
ardship community attempted to remedy some of these issues by analyzing the nature of
‘digital objects’ and their relationship to the information they are intended to carry. Despite
the many insights, none of these approaches is complete and consistent: they still rely on
loosely defined terms and underdeveloped conceptual foundations.
In order to consolidate their insights within an ontologically consistent framework free of
misleading metaphors and category mistakes, we approached the problem from the radically
different perspective of understanding information preservation challenges as communication
challenges, appealing to established theories and paradigms for theorizing communication
and representation, and building on previous research in information representation we con-
ducted as Data Conservancy Data Concepts (DCDC) research group at the University of
Illinois.
Starting from the Basic Representation Model (BRM) [Wickett et al., 2012], the notions of
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situation and situation type from Situation Theory [Devlin, 1995], along with an account of
informing derived from the Gricean theory of meaning, have been adopted to develop a con-
ceptual framework of information communication useful to analyze information preservation
through a communication lens.
This conceptual framework is then applied to analyze information preservation scenarios
where artefacts are intended to carry information and to support its access over time.
While a concrete representation is always required in order for an agent to be presented
with certain information —and therefore material preservation applies to a certain extent—,
what information the agent is presented with is a function of the interpretive frame [Dubin
et al., 2011] the agent brings into bear in a contextual cognitive interpretation process.
We distinguished between persistent material artefacts functioning directly as concrete
representations of information for human access, and information intended to be carried by
ephemeral, yet concrete, performances of digital materials.
We emphasized that a different level of communication needs to happen at the machine
level to produce such performances. This communication involves interpreting bit–level
representations according to appropriate machine–level interpretive frames and needs to be:
1. reliable —i.e. it needs to happen in virtue of established procedures appropriately
executed;
2. sustained — i.e. it can be repeated over time and across changes in the underlying
technology.
When communication is reliable and sustained, performances of a particular intended
type—i.e. performances that exemplify the essential characteristics encoded by an intended
digital material— can be produced over time and across changes in the underlying technology.
When a performance of a particular intended type is produced, a user attuned to an ap-
propriate user–level interpretive frame is in the position to be presented with the information
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that performances of that type are intended to carry.
From a digital stewardship perspective, ‘preserving information’ is therefore understood
as
successfully sustained reliable communication through time and across changes in
the mediating digital technology
where both levels of communication —the machine and the human one— need to be
sustained by means of capturing and documenting the agents’ requirements, in terms of
relevant levels of representations and appropriate interpretive frames, to successfully resolve
an intended communication act. The appropriateness here is a function of decisions made
at the time of ‘creation’ of a particular digital material according to a communication intent
and possible transformative preservation actions applied according to particular preservation
intents.
8.1 Future work
The research presented here is intended to move forward the agenda of defining sound concep-
tual foundations for digital stewardship by tackling the problem of preserving information.
Other aspects related to the informative function of, and experiential engagement with,
digital materials can benefit from a similar attention and analytical treatment.
As we noted above, the communication of information is a highly interactive process, where
many contextual factors affect what information emerges. For example, when scientific data
are reused in contexts other than the one where the data were generated, other information
might emerge in virtue of potentially different interpretive frames applied in the process and
different contextual information. The problem of capturing contextual information necessary
for the application of an appropriate interpretive frame was extensively discussed within
the digital stewardship community [CCSDS, 2002, Lee, 2011]. Perspectives from Situation
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Semantics can be applied to help understand and model how different contextual information
can inflect what digital materials carry for users of different communities.
The conceptual framework we developed here already addressed certain experiential as-
pects of the user engagement with digital materials. However, certain digital materials
exhibit dynamic and interactive components, where the users’ input actively affects the
experiential engagement with those materials. Example in this sense are complex digital
objects that are database–driven —where query from users affects the characteristics of
performances produced over time [Duranti and Thibodeau, 2006,Duranti et al., 2008]— or
interactive media like video games [McDonough, 2011,McDonough, 2012, Sacchi and Mc-
Donough, 2012]—where each playing session can lead to very different performances as well.
The question of what it really means to preserve certain interactive characteristics, what
such a preservation entails, and what is their relations with those characteristics intended
to carry information, certainly require extensions to the theory presented here.
While we recognise that this research is constrained to the problem of preserving infor-
mation and does not cover the entire spectrum of characteristics that might be required
for digital stewardship to be considered successful, the work presented in this dissertation
sets the stage to continue research in these areas by showing how the analysis of fundamen-
tal concepts in digital stewardship can move forward the conceptual foundations of digital
stewardship agenda and inform future practice.
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